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ABSTRACT

This study examines emigration and political action as related phenomena in the
context of the ethnic Serbian community in post-independence Kosovo. Albert O.
Hirschman’s (1970, 1993) work on exit and voice as two primary responses to decline in
firms, organizations, and states provided the theoretical framework for the study. An
attempt was made to integrate the individual context, assessed through the lens of human
security, into the exit-voice framework. The study’s hypotheses regarded relations
between emigration as exit and political action as voice at different levels of human
security. Rational-choice determinants of exit and voice, as well as loyalty to Kosovo,
were also considered.
The study was carried out on a sample of 106 adults from 5 Serbian enclaves
located in the territory of Kosovo to the south of the Ibar River. The data were collected
in the fall of 2009 during the two-week period immediately preceding independent
Kosovo’s first mayoral and municipal assembly elections. Study participants completed a
self-administered paper-and-pencil survey in which they responded to questions about
their desire to leave Kosovo, willingness to engage in various forms of political action in
Kosovo, perceptions of their human security situation, and additional beliefs and
considerations conceptually related to the exercise of exit and voice options.
The analysis of data revealed that there was no relationship between exit and
voice in the study’s sample and emigration and political action appeared to be disparate
courses of action. Likely, Kosovo Serbs regarded exit not as an improvement-oriented
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response to declining conditions that Hirschman envisioned, but as a further loss. The
directions of associations between emigration and political action and their respective
costs and benefits were consistent with the rational decision-making process. Greater
potential to emigrate was associated with lower costs and greater benefits of exit and
greater likelihood of political action was associated with lower costs and greater benefits
of voice. Loyalty was associated with exit and voice in the direction consistent with
Hirschman’s model, but only for participants at the greater level of human security. The
data supported the idea that at different levels of human security, the determinants of the
decisions about emigration and political action may vary.
The study contributes to the literature on minority participation and emigration in
ethnically divided societies, as well as to the multidisciplinary literature on
microdynamics of civil conflict.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, wars, conquests, changes in regime, territorial disputes,
establishment of new nation-states, and other political developments have left territorially
concentrated minorities outside their ethnic motherland and unwelcome in the new
political setting. New national borders have often exacerbated ethnic tensions, and new
regimes reversed groups’ fortunes. Previously privileged majorities became
underprivileged minorities and previously oppressed minorities became the oppressors.
Just in the last century and just in the European region alone, hundreds of territorially
concentrated minorities found themselves in new political settings because of changes in
regime and changes in borders.
After World War I, for example, the Paris Peace Conference (1919) formally
recognized the changes in borders of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany,
Greece, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Turkey. Following the end
of the Cold War, symbolized by the dismantling of the Berlin Wall (1989), the composite
parts of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Soviet Union broke apart, Germany reunified,
and in the place of 5 countries, 23 new nation states were established. In many of these
new political settings, long-harbored ethnic dislikes came unleashed. Members of the
new underprivileged minorities became the target of restrictive language use policies,
discriminating citizenship laws, denial of rights and privileges, forced relocations,
persecutions, and ethnic cleansing. In response to deterioration in their social situation,
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some members of new minority groups chose to migrate from the place they used to call
home to the states they were expected to belong to, others chose the path of violent
resistance against the new regime, and still others chose to advance their cause through
peaceful means in the new socio-political context.
Among the most contentious cases of ethnic minority predicament that stems
from both the pre-World-War-I and the post-Cold-War developments is the case of the
ethnic Serbian community in Kosovo.1 For most of the 20th century, Kosovo was an
autonomous province in Serbia, first within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and later the
Yugoslav Federation. Serbs, Albanians, and members of other ethnic groups populated
the province, and although Albanians accounted for the majority of Kosovo population,
Serbs occupied a privileged position due to their majority status in the Serbian State.
Fueled by centuries of ethnic tensions between Serbs and Albanians, violent ethnic
conflict erupted in Kosovo in 1998. In 1999, international community intervened, put an
end to organized violence, and assumed administration of the Kosovo province. After 9
years of the United Nations administration, Kosovo Albanian parliament declared
independence from Serbia in February 2008. At that time, Serbs accounted for
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In discussing Kosovo and its ethnic communities, many would argue that the predicament of the

Serbian community pales in comparison to the torment experienced by the Albanian community,
particularly in the last decade of the 20th century. Although I make no effort to fully describe the
pain and suffering endured by members of the Albanian community in Kosovo, this by no means
implies my insensitivity or a desire to minimize the horrific experiences of persecution,
displacement, and loss of loved ones borne by most, if not all, Albanian families in Kosovo. In
this work, I simply focus on the Serbian community and hence keep the discussion of the
Albanian community to a minimum.
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approximately seven percent of the Kosovo population of some two million people, lived
in Serbian enclaves separate from the Albanians, and maintained their allegiance to
Serbia.
In the newly independent Kosovo, Serbs inherited the long-standing culture of
ethnic prejudices, dilapidated economy, persisting ethnically motivated crimes against
their person and property, and the experience of being minimized to a new
underprivileged minority. Despite the confidence building and economic development
efforts exerted by the international community for nearly a decade, the level of human
security in the Serbian community in Kosovo was not conducive to individual life, health,
development, or success. Personal security was inadequate, economic opportunity scarce,
access to health care and education poor, and cultural security limited. Emigrating to
Serbia or remaining in Kosovo and overcoming adversity became a salient choice for the
members of the Serbian community in Kosovo. Although Serbs have been leaving
Kosovo for many years prior to the declaration of independence, the final act of
severance of Kosovo from Serbia and the ensuing international support for independence
have made the question of what to do, to leave Kosovo or to stay, even more imminent
for Serbs.
The issue of the Serbs’ response to the adversity they experienced in the new
political setting has been of significant concern to the international community, Kosovo
and Serbian governments, and the scholars of ethnic relations and post-Cold-War
political developments. Mass emigration of Serbs from Kosovo would point to failure of
the international community to nurture a multiethnic democracy in Kosovo and failure of
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the new Kosovo government to establish itself as capable of implementing democratic
pluralism, enforcing human rights standards, and securing peace for all.
Undoubtedly, mass emigration of Serbs from Kosovo would present enormous
ethical and practical challenges that would ultimately fall on the shoulders of the
international community. Serb emigration from Kosovo would engender new grievances
that would likely intensify ethnic tensions in the region and possibly lead to new
violence. Assuming that many Serbs would remigrate2 to Serbia, absorbing new residents
would put an additional strain on scarce state resources and likely provoke grievances
with Serbia’s residential population. Given the political relevance of the Serb emigration
from Kosovo, Kosovo government would likely lose credibility with some of its
international supporters and lose funding earmarked for democratic consolidation. The
process of abandoning houses, leaving behind possessions, and severing ties with the
homeland would cause additional pain and suffering in the already traumatized
population of Kosovo Serbs. Security, economic, and psychological implications of Serb
emigration from Kosovo would be far-reaching and unfortunate.
On the other hand, if Serbs chose to stay in Kosovo and respond to the adversity
by exercising their political voice, seeking through political action full realization of their
political, social, and cultural rights as a historic nationality in Kosovo, and holding their
new governing bodies to account, then the prospect of building a stable multiethnic
democratic state of Kosovo would gain in feasibility. The demands of Serbs could range

2

Immig (2009) used the term “remigration” to refer to the natural return of populations to their

“ancestral homeland” (p. 513).
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from guarantees of special representation rights to enforcement of language rights and
nationalization of Serbian holidays. These demands could be advanced through
individual voting and electing local officials to represent Serbs’ interests to the
government and through collective action to vocalize demands for change through
petitions, demonstrations, and protests. As Michael Lipsky (1968) pointed out in his
seminal paper on protest activity as a political resource, “relatively powerless groups”
can receive much of what they demand through protest (p. 1144).
In a setting that is being as closely watched by international observers as Kosovo,
Serbian voice would likely be instrumental in improving the human security for Serbs in
Kosovo. Willingness of Serbs to articulate their demands within the framework of the
new state would point to the emerging trust in the Kosovo government and institutions.
The international community would have succeeded in ensuring relative stability of the
ethnically divided post-conflict polity and the Kosovo government would have shown
progress toward institutionalization of democratic norms. Serb political participation in
the affairs of the new state would influence the dynamics of ethnic relations in Kosovo
and possibly mitigate ethnic tensions.
Both Serbian emigration from Kosovo and Serbian political action have
significant socio-political and economic implications for the international community,
governments of Kosovo and Serbia, members of the Serbian community in Kosovo, and
people in the region. Serbian emigration and political action can potentially contribute to
European integration as well as destabilization of European security.

5

The existing literatures on migration and political action allow for few educated
guesses as to the direction of the Kosovo Serbs’ response to the objectionable state of
affairs they have experienced in Kosovo. However, these literatures are overwhelmingly
separate and have few points of convergence that would permit inferences about the
relationship between emigration and political action as different modes of response to
post-conflict and post-regime-change adversity.
The contemporary migration literature is dedicated primarily to two types of
migration: economic migration and forced migration. Both economic and forced
migration theories rely extensively on the push-pull process of migration originally
conceived of by Ernst G. Ravenstein (1885, 1889): adverse ‘push’ factors (poverty,
unemployment, oppressive laws, social and political hardships) in the sending countries
push out emigrants, and favorable ‘pull’ factors (better standards of living, economic
opportunity, physical safety, religious freedom) in the receiving countries pull in
immigrants. The economic migration theories assume that individuals make the choice of
whether to migrate or remain in their native setting by way of a complex process of
rational economic decision making: comparing alternatives and weighing costs and
benefits (e.g., Borjas, 1989; Isaac, 1947; Massey, 2000; Stark, 1991). Conversely, the
forced migration theories assume that the decision to migrate is arrived at by way of a
more simplistic process: when individuals’ personal integrity is threatened, they migrate
to a safer place (e.g. Davenport, Moore, & Poe, 2003; Moore & Shellman, 2004;
Richmond, 1993; Schmeidl, 1997; Wood, 1994). Within either stream of thinking,
migration can be thought of as a reactionary response to dissatisfying state of affairs in
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one’s native setting: either after complex deliberations or as a basic fight-or-flight
reaction, individuals leave their present setting because it is not conducive to their life,
health, development, or success. In other words, when the level of human security in the
individuals’ native setting does not award them freedom from fear and freedom from
want, they may respond by moving away.
An analogous inference can be drawn from the political action literature: when
individuals are dissatisfied with the current state of affairs, they may respond by
becoming politically active, voicing their discontent, and demanding action from their
governing bodies. The grievance and relative deprivation theories that hold that political
action arises out of discontent, grievances, and relative deprivation have a prominent
place in the political action literature (Davies, 1962, 1969; Feierabend & Feierabend,
1972; Gurr, 1970; Smesler, 1962). Scholars have looked at association between political
action and different types of deprivation, including unemployment (Khawaja, 1994;
Myers, 1997), income (Paige, 1971; Spilerman, 1971), education (Olzak & Shannahan,
1996; Wilkes, 2004), availability and cost of food and commodities (Feierabend &
Feierabend, 1966; Snyder & Tilly, 1972), and health conditions (Gurr & Moore, 1997).
Although scholars of political action disagree as to how well grievance and relative
deprivation theories explain political action, compared to, for example, resource
mobilization (e.g. Tilly, 1978), political opportunity (e.g., Tarrow, 1994), and rational
actor (e.g. Muller & Weede, 1990) explanations, the conclusion that discontent with the
current state of affairs plays a part in political action behavior remains undisputed
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(Klandermans, 1984). Rather than being conflicting, theories of political action appear to
be complementary and tend to converge in many important ways.
Accordingly, similar to migration, political action can be thought of as a reactionary
response to dissatisfying state of affairs in one’s native setting. Moreover, there exists a
theoretical basis for speculating that there is a relationship between these seemingly
disparate courses of action, migration and political action. The goal of the present study is
to investigate this possible relationship between Serb emigration from Kosovo and Serb
political action in Kosovo as responses to the objectionable state of affairs they have
experienced in Kosovo.
In his influential work on individual response to decline in firms, organizations,
and states, Albert O. Hirschman (1970) proposed that individuals affected by the decline
primarily resort to either of the two courses of action: exit and voice. By exit Hirschman
assumed the act of leaving the organization and by voice – “any attempt at all to change,
rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs” (Hirschman, 1970, p. 30).
Hirschman posited that there is a relationship between exit and voice, such that as
opportunities for exit decline, voice gains in volume. If emigration is regarded as exit and
political action as voice, then, according to Hirschman, there exists a relationship
between emigration and political action such that as emigration potential declines,
likelihood of political action increases. In other words, emigration and political action act
as alternatives, and a person may resort to political action instead of emigrating or vice
versa. Hence, when looking at Kosovo Serbs’ response to deterioration in their social
situation, one would expect to find that persons with the greater potential to emigrate are
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less likely to engage in political action in Kosovo and persons with lesser potential to
emigrate are more likely to engage in political action in Kosovo.
Several authors regarded Hirschman’s work on exit and voice when attempting to
explain responses of group members to the objectionable state of affairs in a political
context. Bremmer (1994), Laitin (1995), and Evans (1998) looked at the Russian
minorities responding to their newfound disadvantaged position of a minority in the postSoviet Ukraine, Estonia and Bashkortostan, and Estonia, respectively. Wille (2001) and
Lee (1992) looked at the discontent of the members of the Russian and Chinese majority,
respectively, with the undesirable government performance. Tajfel (1975) theorized on
the extension of the exit-voice dynamic specifically to the intergroup context. Although
these authors offered various insights on exit-voice responses to adversity in political
settings, it was Hirschman’s exit-voice terminology rather than his arguments that they
utilized. These authors made only cursory use of Hirschman’s work and tested no
hypotheses based on Hirschman’s theory.
Conversely, Pfaff and Kim (2003) and Okamoto and Wilkes (2008) drew on
Hirschman’s theory to derive a set of hypotheses about exit-voice dynamics in adverse
political contexts and tested them empirically. Okamoto and Wilkes (2008) examined the
relationship between costs and opportunities associated with exercising exit and voice
options and engagement in exit and voice by minority groups who faced threats to their
security. The authors used the Minorities at Risk dataset that contained information on
some 275 minority groups around the world and found considerable support for
Hirschman’s model. The authors found that minority groups that had opportunities to
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emigrate were less likely to participate in rebellion and groups that had opportunities to
rebel were less likely to emigrate.
Pfaff and Kim (2003) examined the relationship between exit and voice in 214
East German administrative counties and municipalities and the capital city of East Berlin
prior to and during the East German revolution in September 1989 – March 1990. The
authors found strong support for the inverted-U-curve relationship between exit and
voice: the incidence of protest activities was the highest in municipalities with a moderate
degree of emigration and lower in the municipalities where emigration was rare and also
in municipalities where massive emigration occurred. The authors concluded that exit not
only undermines voice as Hirschman proposed, but also triggers voice.
Like Pfaff and Kim (2003), scholars of the fall of the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) have employed Hirschman’s arguments on exit and voice (e.g.
Brubaker, 1990; Lohmann, 1994; Torpey, 1991), and Hirschman (1993) himself offered a
conceptual essay Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic to
elaborate on the exit-voice dynamic. What the history of the GDR showed was that for
the first 39 years, exit and voice worked in the GDR as predicted (exit undermined the
development of voice), but in the last months of the republic’s existence, exit and voice
worked in tandem and jointly brought the East Germany to its halt. Empirical studies of
exit and voice in adverse political contexts indeed showed that not only exit and voice
can undermine each other, as Hirschman (1970) originally proposed, but also exit and
voice can reinforce each other, as Hirschman (1993) later conceded. Referring to the
GDR’s collapse, Hirschman (1993) wrote, “the exit-voice perspective [was] enriched by

10

its encounter with a complex historical testing ground” (p. 175). “But it could not be
expected to be universally valid, and indeed the events of 1989 in the GDR traced out a
very different relationship” (p. 177).
It is reasonable to believe that the GDR’s case is not unique to the extent that it
exemplified both rival and complementary relationship between exit and voice. In the
case of the ethnic Serbian community in Kosovo, both rival and complementary
relationship between exit and voice may be found as well, so that as exit potential
increases, the likelihood of voice decreases, as Hirschman’s model predicts, and also that
as exit potential increases, the likelihood of voice increases as well, as the case of the
GDR’s collapse showed. Further, I expect that the level of human security impacts on the
nature of the relationship between exit and voice. Before moving forward, let me define
what I mean by human security.
At its most basic, human security refers to the safety and wellbeing of the
individual (Muggah & Krause, 2006). More specifically, human security refers to a
comprehensive security of an individual from “fear, conflict, ignorance, poverty, social
and cultural deprivation, and hunger, resting upon positive and negative freedoms” (Van
Ginkel & Newman, 2000, p. 79). The paradigm of human security emerged in the early
1990s as the focus of security in the post-Cold-War discourse began to shift from the
state to the individual. The paradigm holds that sustainable peace can be achieved only
through individual freedom from fear and freedom from want and thus focuses on
fulfillment of basic human needs and protection of human dignity. The United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP; 1994) has identified seven domains of human
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security: economic, personal, political, food, health, community, and environmental
security. Threats within each domain of human security can lead to insecurity,
generalized poverty, and threats to personal integrity. In the present study, I speak of the
levels of human security to describe individual conditions in which the choice between
exit and voice arises. The low level of human security involves conditions of substantial
hardship and is characterized by the presence of significant threats to personal integrity
and scarcity of resources and opportunities to mitigate these threats. At the greater level
of human security, individuals experience reduced hardship and have greater resources
and opportunities to mitigate possible threats to personal integrity.
I propose that when investigating people’s responses to the objectionable state of
affairs, it is important to understand the conditions in which they are choosing to exercise
exit or voice. I expect that exit and voice have different relationships at different levels of
human security. At the low level of human security, exit and voice act as alternative
responses to hardship, as Hirschman (1970) originally predicted. In a sense, exit and
voice compete for scarce resources and hence undermine each other. On the other hand,
at the greater level of human security, when greater resources and opportunities, and
hence greater choice, are available to individuals, exit and voice reinforce each other. In
his later writings, Hirschman (1993) himself allowed for an occasional complementary
relationship between exit and voice and specifically under the conditions of greater
choice. He wrote that with more choice comes more awareness and more desire to
explore the whole range of options that may be available to human agents (Hirschman,
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1993). Thus, I propose that the relationship between emigration and political action varies
with the level of human security.
Both migration and political action literatures regard hardship that “pushes”
individuals into purposive action as a powerful determinant of emigration and political
action, respectively. Inadequate physical security, lack of economic opportunity, poor
access to heath care and education, hazardous environmental conditions, denial of
political rights – or the whole spectrum of challenges to human security – can serve as
underlying reasons for emigration and political action. Scarce evidence exists that
depending on the type of threats to their security, individuals may be more likely to
respond to the objectionable state of affairs with emigration as opposed to political action
or both modes of response. Under the condition of economic hardship, for example,
minority groups were found more than twice as likely to engage in political action than to
emigrate (Okamoto & Wilkes, 2008; see also Boswell & Dixon, 1990). Okamoto and
Wilkes (2008) also found that under the condition of restricted political freedom,
minority groups were more likely to exercise both modes of response, emigration and
political action, as opposed to only political action. Several studies have confirmed that
when faced with threats to their physical safety, people tend to flee (Davenport, Moore,
& Poe, 2003; Schmeidl, 1995, 1997).
Accordingly, I proffer that the level of human security impacts on the relationship
between emigration as exit and political action as voice. I hypothesize that at the low
level of human security, the relationship between exit and voice will be as Hirschman
proposed it: exit and voice operate as alternatives so that when opportunities for exit

13

decline, voice gains in volume. However, as the level of human security increases, the
relationship between exit and voice changes, and at the greater level of human security,
exit and voice work in tandem so that when opportunities for exit increase, voice gains in
volume. Hence, when looking at Kosovo Serbs’ response to the objectionable state of
affairs they have experienced in Kosovo, one would expect to find that for persons at the
low level of human security, the greater potential to emigrate is associated with a reduced
likelihood of political action in Kosovo and for persons at the greater level of human
security, the greater potential to emigrate is associated with an increased likelihood of
political action in Kosovo.
In sum, the research question that drives this study is as follows,
What is the relationship between emigration and political action of Serbs in
Kosovo at different levels of human security?
The main hypotheses that I test in this study are as follows,
Hypothesis 1: At the low level of human security, persons with the greater potential to
emigrate are less likely to engage in political action in Kosovo and persons
with the lesser potential to emigrate are more likely to engage in political
action in Kosovo.
Hypothesis 2: At the greater level of human security, persons with the greater potential
to emigrate are more likely to engage in political action in Kosovo and
persons with the lesser potential to emigrate are less likely to engage in
political action in Kosovo.
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To test these hypotheses, I rely on the original data that were collected in five
Serbian enclaves in Kosovo in the fall of 2009. More than one hundred Kosovo Serbs
completed a self-administered paper-and-pencil survey in which they responded to
questions about their desire to leave Kosovo, willingness to engage in various forms of
political action in Kosovo, perceptions of their human security situation, and additional
beliefs, attitudes, constraints, and considerations conceptually related to the exercise of
exit and voice options. These data allow for a quantitative analysis of the hypothesized
relationships between exit and voice at different levels of human security.
An essential element of the data is the time when the data were collected. On 15
November 2009, Kosovo held first mayoral and municipal assembly elections after
declaration of independence on 18 February 2008. Leading up to 15 November 2009, the
subject of Kosovo Serbs’ participation in the elections was widely discussed in
intergovernmental circles and popularized in regional media. Intergovernmental and
nongovernmental organizations, governments of Serbia and Kosovo, and regional elites
made calls to Kosovo Serbs to either participate in the elections or abstain from casting
their votes in Kosovo. The data collection for this study was carried out during the twoweek period immediately preceding the Kosovo elections, between 29 October and 14
November. Hence, it is likely that the majority of the participants in the survey were
aware of the upcoming elections and had already considered whether they would exercise
their voice through voting and thus engage in one of the most fundamental forms of
political action. The popular and official rhetoric about the position of Serbs in Kosovo
during the weeks leading up to the elections may have promoted individual reflections on
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their life in Kosovo among Kosovo Serbs. If so, the study participants may have already
thought through the questions similar to the ones in the survey, such as whether they were
willing to participate in the local elections and whether they were seriously considering
leaving Kosovo, prior to taking the survey. This anticipated mental awareness among the
study participants of the issues that were covered in the survey may have awarded
improved data validity.
The next chapter provides the historical context for the emergence of the question
on Kosovo Serb emigration and political action and lays out the theoretical framework
for analyzing Kosovo Serbs’ response to the objectionable state of affairs they have
experienced in Kosovo. Chapter III details the method employed in the present study.
Chapter IV covers the quantitative analysis. The concluding chapter answers the main
question of this study – What is the relationship between emigration and political action
of Serbs in Kosovo at different levels of human security? – and offers a discussion of
findings and their implications.
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CHAPTER TWO
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter reviews the recent history of Kosovo with a particular emphasis on
the position of Kosovo Serbs, and describes the socio-economic and political climate in
Kosovo around the time of data collection for the present study. Next, the chapter lays
out the theoretical and conceptual bases for the present study, including Albert O.
Hirschman’s work on exit and voice and contemporary conceptualization of human
security.

Historical Background
Kosovo is a small, poor, newly independent country with a population of 1.815
million3 people (Central Intelligence Agency, July 2010 estimate) and a long history of
ethnic tensions between Serbs and Albanians. Today, Kosovo is more ethnically
homogenous than most states with the ethnic Albanian majority representing 88 percent
of the population, ethnic Serbs accounting for 7 percent of the population, and other

3

The exact figure for the population of Kosovo remains unknown. Citing the Statistical Office of

Kosovo (Woehrel, 2009, 2010) and the 1991 Yugoslav census (Kim & Woehrel, 2007, 2008), the
United States Congressional Research Service has referred to the figures of 2.1 million and 1.96
million, respectively. The 1991 Yugoslav census was largely boycotted by Kosovo Albanians, or
the majority of Kosovo’s population. The previous Yugoslav census held in 1981 recorded the
total population of Kosovo at 1,584,410 (Klemencic, 1998).
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ethnic minorities, including Bosniak, Gorani, Roma, Turk, Ashkali, and Egyptian,
accounting for the remaining 5 percent (United States Department of State, 2010).
In the 14th century, Kosovo was the heartland of the Serbian medieval kingdom.
With the Ottoman conquest, the Serbian state disappeared from the political map until
1878 when the Congress of Berlin reorganized the Balkan countries in the wake of
Russia’s victory in the Russo-Turkish war. Serbia rose from under the decaying Ottoman
Empire as a sovereign state, but without Kosovo as part of its territory.4 Kosovo remained
under the Ottoman rule until 1913 when in the course of the Balkan wars Kosovo once
again became part of Serbia. At that time, Kosovo population was predominantly ethnic
Albanian and mainly Muslim by religion. The majority of the 400,000 Albanian residents
of Kosovo (Rogel, 2003) resisted the idea of becoming a territory of Orthodox Christian
Serbia and continued to defy Serbian rule through most of the 20th century.
In the new Yugoslav Federation that emerged after World War II, Kosovo gained
the administrative status of an autonomous region of the republic of Serbia. At that time,
Serbs accounted for almost a quarter of the Kosovo population. However, because of the
Serb migration out of Kosovo to central Serbia, Albanian migration to Kosovo from other
parts of Yugoslavia, and the highest in Europe birth rate among Albanian population, the
proportion of Serbs in Kosovo decreased from 23 percent in 1948 to 13 percent in 1981
(Hammel & Stevanovic, 2002).5 Under Josip Broz Tito’s leadership of Yugoslavia, ethnic
4

For popular accounts of Kosovo’s history, see Judah (2008), Malcolm (1998), Vickers (1998).

5

There is a considerable variation on composition of Kosovo population in literature.

Vladisavljevic (2002) cites the proportion of Serbs in the Kosovo population as 27.5% between
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tensions between Serbs and Albanians, developed during the centuries of the Ottoman
rule, were kept largely at bay. In 1974, Kosovo was accorded the status of the
autonomous province and although nominally remaining part of Serbia came to enjoy the
rights similar to those of the six republics of Yugoslavia, except the right of secession
from the federation.
Ethnic pressures in Kosovo began slowly to build in the late 1970s and, following
Tito’s death, rapidly escalated in the early 1980s. In 1981, fueled by deeply felt
frustrations over the lack of economic opportunities and inferior standards of living in
Kosovo compared to central Serbia or elsewhere in Yugoslavia, Kosovo Albanians
organized a series of nationalist protests in Kosovo. Protestors demanded elevation of
Kosovo’s status to that of the seventh republic and the national liberation from Serbia. By
the mid-1980s, both Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo mobilized along ethnic lines and
publicly voiced their grievances over mistreatment by the other ethnic group. There exists
extensive literature on Kosovo Albanian mobilization in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g. Clark,
2000; Kostovicova, 2005; Mertus, 1999; Perritt, 2008; Ramet, 2002, 2006). For the
purposes of the present study, I briefly account for the Kosovo Serb engagement in
political action.
In October 1985, about 2,000 Kosovo Serbs signed a petition addressed to the
federal and Serbia’s communist leadership in which they expressed grievances about
throughout the 1980s” (p. 777). The 1981 Yugoslav census registered the total population of
Kosovo at 1,584,410 (Klemencic, 1998) and listed some 85,000 Kosovo Serbs living elsewhere in
Yugoslavia after having left Kosovo sometime between 1961 and 1981 (Vladisavljevic, 2002).
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intimidation by Albanians who were forcing Serbs out of Kosovo and about local
authorities’ refusal to do anything to protect Serbs.6 Starting with the petition, Serbian
voice proceeded to gain in volume and within a matter of months grew to the popular
grass roots movement. In their appeals to Yugoslavia’s and Serbia’s officials, Kosovo
Serbs cited various forms of mistreatment of Serbs by Kosovo Albanians, including
crimes against person and property and refusal to enforce the law and protect the rights of
Serbs by Albanian officials. In June 1986, several hundred Kosovo Serbs collectively
moved out from the village of Batusi in protest and set out in their tractors and cars for
central Serbia. By using exit from Kosovo as a form of voice, Serbs from Batusi aimed to
create an emergency situation and draw the attention of authorities to their cause. The
exit attempt was not successful as the Serb procession was stopped by the police, but the
Batusi Serbs gained support from other Serbs in Kosovo who similarly voiced their intent
to collectively leave Kosovo in protest if Albanian harassment continued. In November
1986 some 200 Kosovo Serbs traveled to Belgrade and protested against lack of police
protection for Serbs in Kosovo. The demands of the Serb movement centered around
removal of the Kosovo Albanian provincial leadership who were accused of tacitly
approving of mistreatment and discrimination of Serbs and around the idea of bringing
Kosovo back under the jurisdiction of Serbia’s authorities.
Until 1987, Kosovo Serbs had few advocates in the federal Yugoslav and Serbia’s
leadership. In the newly appointed Serbia’s party leader Slobodan Milosevic, Kosovo
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Serbs found a vocal supporter who ultimately exploited the Kosovo Serb’s discontent for
spearheading a campaign of Serbian nationalism. On his first official visit to Kosovo in
April 1987, thousands of disgruntled Kosovo Serb protesters met Milosevic in the town
of Kosovo Polje and impressed him with the show of commitment to their cause. Over
the following year, the Kosovo Serb movement continued to grow and, on account of
Milosevic, gained visibility in Yugoslavia. In May 1988, over 50,000 Kosovo Serbs
signed a petition addressed to the federal and Serbia’s assemblies complaining of the
continuing lack of safety for Serbs in Kosovo and threatening to collectively leave
Kosovo in protest if the security situation was not rapidly improved (Vladisavljevic,
2002). Kosovo Serbs did not use the threat of exit only as a form of voice – over the
course of the 1980s, some 25,000 Serbs had left Kosovo.7 Referring to the Serb migration
out of Kosovo in the 1980s, Ramet (1997) cites that “in many cases, real and possible
threats to women and female children were the main reason for [Serbs’] moving away”
(p. 146).
In the summer and early fall of 1988, general discontent with the crumbling
economy and inefficient leadership gave rise to a series of popular demonstrations in
Vojvodina, another autonomous province of Serbia, central Serbia, and Montenegro. The
voice of Kosovo Serbs was one of the many Yugoslav voices demanding attention. By
7
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then the purge of Kosovo’s Albanian officials, initiated by the Milosevic’ apparatus, was
well underway and Kosovo Albanians were organizing protests against the strengthening
wave of repressions. In February 1989, Kosovo Albanians’ protests turned into a general
strike and in March 1989, the Serbian presidency declared the situation in Kosovo as a
threat to the country’s security. In late March 1989, the Assembly of Serbia approved
constitutional changes effectively revoking the autonomy of Kosovo that was granted in
the 1974 constitution and stripping Kosovo of the control over police, education, and
economic policy. A decade of Kosovo Albanian struggle for Kosovo independence and
against Serbian oppression followed. Such political developments removed reasons for
protest for most supporters of the Kosovo Serb movement and the movement dissipated.
The analysis of the Kosovo Serb movement by Vladisavljevic (2002) reveals that
very few movement activists demanded that their problems be addressed through
repression of Kosovo Albanians. The movement did not employ violent tactics and
instead relied on petitions, demonstrations, public meetings, delegations, and threats and
attempts of exit as its main forms of voice. The Kosovo Serbian voice gained in volume
in response to incidents of assault on Serbs by Kosovo Albanians and other
manifestations of insecurity for Serbs in Kosovo. The intentions of Kosovo Serbs were
often misrepresented and their plight exaggerated by Milosevic and his apparatus in order
to pursue nationalistic ambitions. However, Kosovo Serbs did not publicly reject Serbian
government policies against Kosovo Albanians that followed the revocation of Kosovo
autonomy. Their tacit approval of the systematic repression and persecution of Albanians
in Kosovo eventually provoked a furious backlash against the Kosovo Serbian
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community. When the Kosovo Albanian movement began to grow increasingly violent in
the mid-1990s, it was ordinary Kosovo Serbs who were among the victims of attacks by
Kosovo Albanian guerillas.
In the early 1990s, the Kosovo Albanian movement of resistance to Serb
domination relied on nonviolent activism that included denying legitimacy of Serbian and
federal authorities and building up alternative national institutions run by Kosovo
Albanians. A parallel system of institutions began to function outside of the mainstream
system run by Serbs and reached high levels of efficiency particularly in the areas of
healthcare and education. Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians lived and worked in
practical segregation from each other. In the mid-1990s, frustrated by lack of
advancement of the Kosovo Albanian nationalist cause, ethnic Albanian guerrillas calling
themselves the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) embraced the idea of armed struggle
against Serb oppression. In early 1996, the KLA launched a campaign of violence against
Serbian police stations, military posts, and post offices in Kosovo. The Yugoslav8
authorities responded with a counter-campaign, and consequently, in early 1998, the
conflict escalated into open armed confrontation. From February 1998 until March 1999,
conflict between the KLA and Yugoslav forces drove more than 400,000 Kosovars,
8
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including ethnic Albanians, Serbs, Goranis, Bosniaks, Roma, Ashkalis, Turks, and
Egyptians from their homes and claimed the lives of 2,500 people (Kim & Woehrel,
2007).
In March 1999, after a year of heavy Western diplomacy that failed to persuade or
pressure Milosevic to abandon the Yugoslav forces’ excessive use of force in response to
KLA’s insurgency, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched a bombing
campaign against Serbia. Yugoslav forces in Kosovo intensified aggression against
Kosovo Albanians, forcing the majority of ethnic Albanian population to flee their homes
and seek refuge in Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro. After 78 days of air strikes,
Milosevic agreed to withdraw his forces from Kosovo and surrendered physical control
of the province to the United Nations (UN).9 The United Nations Security Council
adopted resolution 1244 in June 1999 that placed Kosovo, legally still a territory of
Serbia, under UN administration (United Nations Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo; UNMIK). The NATO-led Kosovo International Security Force (KFOR)
assumed control of peace and security and Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) sent its largest mission to promote human rights, rule of law, and
democracy building in Kosovo.
Shortly after the pullout of the Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and deployment of
KFOR, the overwhelming majority of Albanian refugees returned to Kosovo and
reclaimed the official institutions and functions that were controlled by Serbs during the
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1990s. At the same time, some 200,000 Serbs as well as Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptians
minorities left the province because of violence and intimidation by Kosovo Albanians.10
Upon their return to Kosovo, ethnic Albanians launched a retaliatory campaign of ethnic
cleansing against Kosovo Serbs and other minorities: many Serbs were killed and went
missing and many Serb houses were looted and burned. To use but one example, in July
1999, 14 Serbian farmers from the village of Staro Gracko were massacred as they were
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working together in their fields. Consequently, many Serb families left Staro Gracko and
relocated to central Serbia.11
In response to extreme insecurity, the Kosovo Serb movement experienced a
short-lived resurgence. Remaining activists from the Serbian enclaves relied on the old
tactics of petitions and demonstrations and appealed to KFOR and UNMIK for physical
protection. Kosovo Serbs also exercised another form of expressing their grievances,
boycott of elections, when they collectively refused to participate in the first postwar
municipal elections in October 2000 and charged UNMIK and KFOR with ineffective
protection of Kosovo Serbs from ethnic Albanian violence. By boycotting Kosovo
elections, Serbs exercised a form of psychological exit – they did not physically leave the
province, but they withdrew from the political process that was important for the
functioning of Kosovo.
In May 2001, UNMIK issued a Constitutional Framework for Provisional SelfGovernment in Kosovo, which provided for the establishment of Kosovo legislature. In
the first postwar legislative elections held in November 2001, Kosovo Serbs participated
in substantial numbers and secured several seats for a moderate coalition of Serbian
parties called Povratak (Return in English). In March 2002, the Kosovo Assembly chose
a President and a government, including one Kosovo Serb for a cabinet post. The second
postwar municipal elections were held in October 2002. Serb turnout was significantly
lower than in the legislative elections – 20 percent and 47 percent, respectively (Kim &

11

Personal interviews with schoolteachers, Staro Gracko, October 2008.

26

Woehrel, 2007) – and almost no Serbs voted in the northern town of Mitrovica.12 Likely,
many Serbs did not feel safe to participate in the municipal elections and were generally
disillusioned about the effectiveness of the Serbian voice to produce a difference in their
human security situation. Ethnically motivated crimes against the Serbian community and
intimidation by Kosovo Albanians were widespread despite heavy patrolling by the
KFOR troops and sizeable international presence.
In March 2004, a tide of organized attacks by Kosovo Albanians against Kosovo
Serbs and other minorities swept over Kosovo. KFOR evacuated some villages, but did
not hold back the destruction. In the course of 2 days of violence perpetrated by
thousands of persons, 19 people were killed, 954 injured, 4,100 displaced, and some 30
Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries, schools and hospitals, and hundreds of
houses were burned and looted (Human Rights Watch, 2006). This was the worst flare-up
of ethnic violence since the end of the war and as it happened on the UN’s watch, it
damaged UNMIK’s credibility and put into question the commitment of the international
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community to protection of rights and security of minorities in Kosovo.13 The UN
Security Council strongly condemned the anti-Serb violence and called for additional
efforts to ensure sustainable returns of displaced persons and freedom of movement of
minorities in Kosovo.
In the wake of the March pogroms, many Serbs exited Kosovo, particularly the
last remaining urban Serbs from the cities of Pristina and Prizren (International Crisis
Group (ICG), 2009). The rate of minority returns to Kosovo had slowed significantly.14
Povratak members withdrew from the political arena and Serb deputies took leave of
their positions (ICG, 2009). Serbia’s government called upon Kosovo Serbs who stayed
in Kosovo to boycott Kosovo institutions and consequently, very few Kosovo Serbs
voted in the October 2004 parliamentary elections. In June 2006, local Serb authorities in
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northern Kosovo15 moved to sever relationships with the Kosovo government and
UNMIK on account of continued Albanian-led violence against Serbs.
In early 2006, UN began to lead a lengthy process of negotiations on Kosovo
status. The Kosovo negotiation team did not include any Kosovo Serbs, who were instead
represented on Serbia’s side. The negotiations failed to produce an agreement between
Serbia’s and Kosovo’s leadership and culminated in the Comprehensive Proposal for the
Kosovo Status Settlement that was prepared by UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari.
Ahtisaari recommended independence for Kosovo with international civilian and military
supervision and provided for extensive protections of the rights and interests of the
Kosovo Serb community, particularly through decentralization at the local level.
According to the Ahtisaari plan, local Kosovo Serb governments in Serb majority
municipalities would have extensive control over local affairs, particularly in the areas of
education, healthcare, and cultural affairs, would have the right to directly cooperate with
Serbia, and would maintain significant local ownership of the security sector
(Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, Annex III).
Until the release of the Ahtisaari plan in early 2007, UN Security Council
resolution 1244 formed the basis for the international presence in Kosovo. The resolution
gave temporary authority to administer Kosovo to UNMIK and supported Yugoslavia’s
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territorial integrity. Ahtisaari’s recommendations for independence for Kosovo and
withdrawal of UNMIK were met with strong opposition by both Serbia and Kosovo
Serbs who held demonstrations in Kosovo and voiced their protest (UN Security Council,
2007, March 9). The plan did not gather sufficient support in the UN Security Council
and ultimately failed to be adopted. Another round of international negotiations on
Kosovo status ensued, but because of the fundamentally opposing positions of Serbia that
conceded to “more than autonomy, less than independence” for Kosovo (“Go Slow on
Kosovo,” 2007, para. 5), and Kosovo Albanian leaders who regarded Kosovo
independence from Serbia as non-negotiable, the negotiations ended in December 2007
without a settlement. In the meantime, UNMIK organized and held municipal and
national elections in Kosovo in November 2007, which were almost completely
boycotted by both Kosovo Serb voters and Kosovo Serb parties.
Frustrated by the repeated delays in the status process and eager to move ahead as
a sovereign state, the Kosovo assembly adopted a unilateral declaration of independence
from Serbia in February 2008. Kosovo Albanian leaders pronounced Kosovo a
multiethnic democracy and pledged to implement the provisions of the Ahtisaari plan,
including extensive minority protections. Several governments of the world’s leading
countries extended their recognition of Kosovo independence at once. Serbia vehemently
opposed Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence and maintained that “Kosovo is
Serbia” (“US Embassy,” 2008, para. 7). Protests and riots broke out in both Serbia and
Kosovo, notably in Northern Kosovo and the divided city of Mitrovica. Serbia’s prime
minister Vojislav Kostunica called upon Kosovo Serbs not to abandon Kosovo, saying,
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“Our people in Kosovo and Metohija must remain in their homes, in their territory, and in
their Serbia” (“Belgrade Warns,” 2008, para. 2).
In May 2008, Serbia held national and municipal elections in Serb-majority
municipalities throughout Kosovo. Whereas the Ahtisaari plan provided for Kosovo Serb
participation in Serbia’s national-level elections, UN officials regarded the extension of
municipal elections to Kosovo as illegal and indicative of Serbia’s intentions to
strengthen its hold on Kosovo Serbs and deter their engagement with Kosovo institutions.
Following the elections, Kosovo Serb leaders in northern Kosovo proceeded with
establishment of their own local institutions, including a parliament (Woehrel, 2009).
In June 2008, UN Secretary general Ban Ki-Moon announced his decision to
“reconfigure” the UN mission in Kosovo in light of profoundly changed circumstances
on the ground (UN Security Council, 2008, para. 19). UNMIK would sharply reduce in
size and tasks and cede its operational role in Kosovo to the European Union-led mission
as envisioned by the Ahtisaari plan. After reaching a compromise with Serbia that the
European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) would operate within a status-neutral
framework of the United Nations and fully honor resolution 1244, the European Union
proceeded with Kosovo-wide deployment of EULEX in December 2008. The Rule of
Law mission would oversee security, legal matters, and customs issues in Kosovo and
gradually phase out UNMIK. Whereas Kosovo Serbs accepted the deployment of the
status-neutral EULEX, they rejected the International Civilian Office charged with
supervision of Kosovo’s implementation of the Ahtisaari plan. The Ahtisaari plan was
perceived as synonymous with Kosovo independence and Kosovo Serbs wanted nothing
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to do with it. Kosovo Serbs also criticized NATO for further drawing down the KFOR
contingent and removing several checkpoints and thus relaxing security protections for
the minority communities in Kosovo (UN Security Council, 2009). From over 50,000
troops in 1999, less than 14,000 troops remained in Kosovo in June 2009 (Woehrel,
2009).
The picture Kosovo presented in the summer of 2009 was that of the state with
fragile security, weak institutions, high levels of government corruption, and powerful
organized crime networks (Commission of the European Communities, 2009). Nearly
half of its population was unemployed and an average annual per capita income was the
lowest in Europe (United States Department of State, 2010). Although Serbia, Kosovo,
and the international community publicly opposed formal partition of Kosovo, Kosovo
was de facto divided into the northern part that was largely under Serbia’s control and the
rest of Kosovo that was independent from Serbia. The Ibar River that ran through the city
of Mitrovica separated the northern part of Kosovo from the rest of the country in all
practical matters. The four northern municipalities were fully dependent on Serbia’s state
support and functioned very much like municipalities in Serbia, albeit significantly less
developed. The authority of Kosovo government did not reach Kosovo’s north and the
prospect of asserting its authority there seemed unrealistic.
To the south of the Ibar River, some 65,000 Kosovo Serbs, mostly subsistence
farmers, lived in small scattered Serbian enclaves surrounded by the Albanian majority
areas, but very much cut off from their Albanian neighbors. New roads, called
“corridors,” had been built to connect enclaves and allow Kosovo Serbs to avoid
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traveling through densely populated Albanian areas. In the enclaves, many homes had
steel bars on their windows, telephone numbers had Serbian country and area codes, and
shops accepted Serbian dinars, instead of Kosovo’s euro. Serbs continued leaving
Kosovo, particularly young people who had virtually no real access to higher education,
few economic opportunities, and few prospects for advancement in Kosovo. After
finishing basic schooling, most left for Serbia. Although the level of crime against
Kosovo Serbs had decreased in comparison with the early and mid-2000s, their safety as
well as the safety of other minorities was still in doubt. Beatings, burglaries, arson,
damage to property, theft of cattle, torching of vehicles, stoning of buses, vandalism of
religious sites and cemeteries, continued (UN Security Council, 2010). At the same time,
Kosovo justice system failed to prosecute the vast majority of crimes and human rights
abuses against members of minority groups.16 Many Serbs felt intimidated and pressured
by their Albanian neighbors to sell their houses and leave Kosovo. Less frequently than
in the previous years, but KFOR convoys still accompanied minority buses carrying
Kosovo Serbs and patrolled the enclaves. Fear, mistrust, and lack of confidence
characterized ethnic relations in Kosovo.
Kosovo Serbs continued to take very little part in Kosovo institutions and instead
to rely on parallel institutions, many of which were still financially and administratively
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supported by Serbia’s government. Serbia had subsidized salaries for teachers, doctors,
and other public sector workers, paid pensions to the elderly, and provided supplies for
schools and medical centers. However, the global economic crisis had imposed
significant budgetary constraints on Serbia’s government and the financial commitment
to Kosovo Serbs became more difficult to sustain. Serbia’s government had cut its 2009
Kosovo budget by over one third, which translated into significantly reduced salaries for
Kosovo Serb professionals and discontinuation of various forms of financial support for
Kosovo Serbs (ICG, 2009). Consequently, some Kosovo Serbs who were collecting
Serbia’s salaries chose to leave Kosovo, others threatened to do so, and still others turned
to Kosovo institutions for income. In July 2009, some 300 Kosovo Serb police officers
who walked out of their jobs in protest to Kosovo declaration of independence in 2008
agreed to return to the Kosovo Police Service (UN Security Council, 2010). Greater
numbers of Kosovo Serbs showed willingness to engage with Kosovo institutions in
pragmatic matters. Over 10,000 Kosovo Serbs had applied for Kosovo identity cards and
as many obtained Kosovo registration plates for their vehicles (UN Security Council,
2010). Some 10-20 percent of Kosovo Serbs were estimated as being open to learning the
Albanian language (Radakovic in Minority Rights Group International, 2009, p. 10).
The progress of decentralization envisioned by Ahtisaari was slow. Kosovo Serbs
were reluctant to engage in any action that could be interpreted as acceptance of
Kosovo’s independence. Although decentralization would allow Kosovo Serbs to elect
their own local leaders, exercise extensive control over local affairs, and maintain
relationships with Serbia, decentralization was associated with the Ahtisaari plan, and the
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Ahtisaari plan was perceived as synonymous with Kosovo independence. Arguably, if the
idea of decentralization were decoupled from the status issue, many of Kosovo Serbs who
had already shown willingness to engage with Kosovo institutions on practical matters,
would be more likely to participate in the local political processes. However, if Serb
engagement were regarded as their endorsement of Kosovo independence, few would
proceed with participation in local political processes.
At the time when data were collected for the present study, Kosovo was preparing
to hold the country’s first mayoral and municipal assembly elections on 15 November
2009, including for the six Serbian-majority municipalities as provided in the Ahtisaari
plan. The elections were to be administered by Kosovo’s own election authorities and
monitored by a coalition of civic groups called the European Network of Election
Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO). Although Serbia’s authorities did not support
Kosovo Serbs’ participation in Kosovo’s elections, Serbia’s President Boris Tadic
promised that the persons who chose to vote needed not fear a backlash from his
government (UN Security Council, 2010).
Kosovo Serb participation in the elections would manifest an important
accomplishment for both the Kosovo government and the international community.
Kosovo Serb participation would signal willingness to proceed with decentralization and
claim ownership of the protections and privileges that came with decentralized
governance. Ultimately, participation would serve the best interests of the Serbs to the
south of the Ibar River. Isolated and vulnerable, these Serbs had few prospects of
enjoying safety and prosperity unless they either exited Kosovo or engaged in the
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political process, ended their isolation, and exercised their voice to seek full realization of
their political, social, and cultural rights as a historic nationality in Kosovo.
The next section lays out in greater detail the theoretical and conceptual bases for
the present study.

Exit and Voice
In his book Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Hirschman (1970) introduced a theory of
individual responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states. According to
Hirschman, exit and voice represent two alternative responses of consumers or members
of organizations to deterioration in the quality of the goods they buy or benefits they
receive. Exit means simply leaving a firm, organization, or state to which one belongs,
generally because a better good or benefit is believed to be available at another firm,
organization, or state. Voice means staying and attempting to reverse the deterioration
through complaining or organizing to complain or to protest or otherwise exercising
one’s voice in an improvement-oriented fashion. Hirschman argued that exit and voice
have a seesaw-like relationship, such that the ease of exit makes voice less likely. He
further introduced the concept of loyalty that affects the individual calculus between exit
and voice by making exit more costly and voice more probable than they would have
been otherwise.
Hirschman’s principal thesis is, “The presence of the exit alternative can …
atrophy the development of the art of voice” (p. 43, emphasis in original). Exit is a onetime fairly straightforward response to dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs.
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Exit provides consumers or members with an immediate relief from deterioration. Voice,
on the other hand, requires customers or members to endure the deterioration for a period
of time. Voice is costly in terms of effort and time, it requires patience and willingness to
put up with uncertainty. To be effective, voice often requires collective action and is thus
subject to difficulties of organizing and free riding. Exit requires little or no coordination
with others, exit is largely a private activity. Exit communicates little more than the
presence of consumers’ or members’ discontent. By using voice, on the other hand,
consumers or members can elaborate on the nature and intensity of their discontent and
suggest, ask, or demand specific corrective actions. Hirschman argued that exit
undermines voice primarily through depriving the dissatisfied consumers or members of
firms, organizations, and states of their most articulate and influential carriers of voice.
He referred to this pattern of action as a hydraulic model: deterioration generates the
pressure of discontent; discontent gets channeled into voice or exit; the more pressure
escapes through exit, the less pressure is available to generate voice.
Hirschman developed his arguments as applicable specifically to situations that
involve some form of decline or deterioration in the state of affairs of the organization
leading to dissatisfaction of members or customers. The previously superior state of
affairs is separated from the later inferior state of affairs by some point of deterioration,
or a moment in time when things changed for the worse. Hirschman did not elaborate on
how soon after the point of deterioration members or customers begin exercising exit and
voice and whether the choice between exit and voice remains salient for a particular
period of time after the point of deterioration. Arguably, as significant time elapses after
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the point of deterioration and no improvement in the state of affairs is observed, the
choice between exit and voice becomes less salient. Those members or customers who
did not exit after the point of deterioration and who perceive no improvement in their
conditions may realize that they had made a mistake by staying and still exit (Barry,
1974). Hence, new exits can continue to occur for some time after the point of
deterioration. Conversely, new voice may require a new point of deterioration or another
change for the worse in order to emerge. Then, responding to yet another change for the
worse, the choice between exit and voice would become salient again and persons
affected by the change would engage in individual calculations regarding whether to exit
or exercise their voice.
Serbs in Kosovo have experienced several points of deterioration in the state of
affairs of the territorial ethnic group to which they belong. Although it would be difficult
to assign the initial point of deterioration to any particular moment in Kosovo Serbs’
history, it is accepted that in the early 1980s, Kosovo Serbs were less safe and less
protected in Kosovo than they were a decade earlier. Responding to the decline in their
safety and security, some Kosovo Serbs chose to exercise their voice and became active
in the popular grass roots movement and some 25,000-30,000 Kosovo Serbs exited
Kosovo during the 1980s (see footnote 7). Another undisputed decline in Kosovo Serbs’
safety and security came with the NATO war and retaliatory violence by Kosovo
Albanians against Kosovo Serbs. Some 65,000 Kosovo Serbs responded to extreme
insecurity by leaving Kosovo (see footnote 10) and few used their voice to appeal to
international community for physical protection. In 2004, Albanian-led pogroms brought
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further decline in Kosovo Serbs’ safety and again many Serbs exited Kosovo in response.
The remaining Serbs chose to express their grievances through boycott of Kosovo’s
institutions and political processes.
With the declaration of independence, the choice between exit and voice for
Kosovo Serbs became highly salient yet again. Whereas no immediate increase in danger
to Kosovo Serbs’ safety was observed, many feared for their wellbeing in the
independent predominantly ethnic Albanian Kosovo with a significantly reduced
presence of the international community and protective forces. In contradiction to the
popular statements by the members of the international community and Kosovo
authorities that asserted the newly independent country’s multi-ethnic character, Serbs
and other minority communities in Kosovo continued to experience persistent exclusion
and discrimination. A year after declaration of independence, human rights organizations
reported on the erosion of minority rights protections in Kosovo and worsening of the
situation for Kosovo Serbs, Gorani, Ashkali, Egyptians, and other minorities (Balkan
Investigative Reporting Network, 2009; Minority Rights Group International, 2009). A
highly acclaimed report by Minority Rights Group International (2009) unequivocally
maintained that the post-independence reality on the ground in Kosovo was forcing
members of minority communities to leave the country for good. At the same time,
increasing numbers of Kosovo Serbs showed willingness to engage with Kosovo
institutions on practical matters. As mentioned above, Kosovo Serbs were applying for
Kosovo identity cards and registration plates, turning to Kosovo institutions for income,
and learning the Albanian language. Hence, it was evident that in the post-independence
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period, amidst concerns about discrimination, employment, education, freedom of
movement, legal protections, and real or perceived fears of further ethnic attacks, Kosovo
Serbs were engaging in the exit-voice calculus yet again and making decisions either to
sever ties with Kosovo or to stay and attempt “to change, rather than to escape from, an
objectionable state of affairs” (Hirschman, 1970, p. 30).
According to Hirschman, the exit-voice calculus is based on the essentially
rational decision-making process whereby persons weigh possible payoffs against likely
costs before choosing to proceed with a particular course of action. Generally, people
choose a course of action when the cost-benefit ratio associated with it compares
favorably with the cost-benefit ratio of the best alternative course of action. That is,
people would choose exit when the net improvement they would derive from exiting after
subtracting the costs of exit would be greater than the net improvement they would derive
from exercising voice after subtracting the costs of voice. In the event that little or no net
improvement was associated with either exit or voice, individuals would likely refrain
from expressing grievances altogether and wait for someone or something else to
improve matters.
The idea of possible improvement in the state of affairs is essential to
Hirschman’s theory. When choosing to respond to decline in firms, organizations, and
states by exercising either voice or exit, persons affected by the decline believe that their
situation can be improved. If they choose to exit, they believe that by leaving the state or
taking their business away from the firm they will improve their lot and that things will
be better for them elsewhere. If they choose to stay where they are and voice their
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dissatisfaction, they believe that by speaking out and participating they will change the
objectionable state of affairs and improve their current matters. Hence, exit and voice can
be thought of as alternative individual responses to situations that are believed to be
improvable. Otherwise, if individuals do not believe in the possibility of improvement in
their situation, the choice between exit and voice looses its consequence.
As part of individual exit-voice deliberations, the perceived improvements or
benefits associated with exercising exit or voice have respective costs. Costs come in a
variety of forms of both economic and psychological nature. Exit is naturally associated
with moving expenses, whether one is moving to a different state or taking one’s business
to a different firm, and emotional tolls of abandoning home and livelihood, severing
social ties, and starting anew elsewhere. Exit in the form of migration is expensive, in
both direct and indirect costs, and most people do not migrate. The costs of exercising
voice are less readily apparent, but in contentious environments, voice can cost someone
their job, social wellbeing, freedom, and hence jeopardize their economic security and
psychological safety. In a rational decision-making process, considerations of benefits
and costs associated with exit or voice go hand in hand; however, a person may be
determined to exercise a particular course of action regardless of the costs involved or
benefits associated with the alternative. For example, such determination can be observed
in individuals mobilized by some cause or martyrs willing to endure suffering for the
sake of their beliefs or ideas. Indeed, Hirschman regarded emotional attachment, or
loyalty, as a powerful contributor to the exit-voice calculus.
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Hirschman (1970) described loyalty as a “less rational, though far from wholly
irrational” motive (p. 38). As a “special attachment to an organization” (p. 77), loyalty
affects the individual calculus between exit and voice by making exit more costly and
voice more probable than they would have been otherwise. The loyalty-related costs of
exit involve psychological costs associated with leaving the place to which one
experiences a powerful sense of belonging and may become prohibitive if one cannot
bear the emotional toll of leaving the place to which one is loyal. Similarly, the loyaltyrelated benefits of voice involve psychological benefits associated with staying in the
place to which one is loyal and attempting to change things for the better. Ultimately,
loyalty is the belief that one is in the right place and things will get better. As conceived
of by Hirschman, “as a rule… loyalty holds exit at bay and activates voice” (p. 78).
However, scholars of Hirschman’s work regard loyalty as a contentious and undertheorized concept, “an ad hoc equation-filler” that can be made to fit the facts after the
fact by assigning sufficient loyalty to a person who should have chosen exit based on the
cost-benefit calculation, but in fact had chosen voice (Barry, 1974, p. 95; also Dowding,
John, Mergoupis, & Van Vugt, 2000).
In its essence, Hirschman’s leading idea about inverse relationship between exit
and voice is simple, but its ramifications are far-reaching. Hirschman regarded his work
on exit and voice primarily as a useful tool for bringing together economic and political
analyses, with exit being the economic and voice the political means of expressing
grievances over decline in firms, organizations, and states. However, Hirschman’s
elegant framework has received popularity across widely differing contexts (see Dowding
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et al., 2000) and has been used to organize extensive body of relevant observations,
including in the context of intimate relationships (Drigota, Whitney, & Rusbelt, 1995),
party membership (Eubank, Gangopadahay, & Weinberg, 1996), voting behavior (Weber,
2009), residential mobility (Orbell & Uno, 1972), and most prominently, workplacerelated contexts (Farrell, 1983; Hoffman, 2006; Turnley & Feldman, 1999; Withey &
Cooper, 1989).
Hirschman’s arguments on exit and voice have received significant attention from
scholars of the fall of the German Democratic Republic (e.g. Brubaker, 1990; Lohmann,
1994; Pfaff & Kim, 2003; Torpey, 1991). Shortly after the opening of the Berlin Wall, on
9 November 1989, a highly prized German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
published “To exit, to voice: On the current relevance of a theory of A. O. Hirschman.”
The author, Henning Ritter, pointed out that the upheaval in East Germany was testing
Hirschman’s 1970 thesis “experimentally on a large scale” (Hirschman, 1993, p. 174).
Subsequently, a number of political scientists and sociologists relied on Hirschman’s
concepts of exit and voice in their interpretations of the GDR’s collapse (Brubaker, 1990;
Torpey, 1991; Hirschman, 1993, refers to the works in German by Offe, 1990, Pollack,
1990, Pollack & Heinze, 1990, and Zapf, 1991, pp. 174-175). Some, like Detlef Pollack
(in Hirschman, 1993, pp. 174-175), pointed out that the events in Germany contradicted
Hirschman’s model and portrayed a complementary, rather than rival, relationship
between exit and voice. In the last months of the republic’s existence, emigration from
East Germany (exit) and protests and demonstrations against the regime (voice) worked
in tandem and jointly brought East Germany to its halt. Hirschman himself agreed that
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the events in 1989 in the GDR exemplified a “spectacular case of collaboration of exit
and voice” (1993, p. 177).
Hirschman conceded that increased availability of exit “can on occasion make for
more rather than less participation and voice” (1993, p. 177, emphasis added). The
author speculated that when the opportunity for exit expands, human agents acquire more
choice; with more choice comes more awareness and more desire to explore the whole
range of options that may be available to them. Hence, once they have the option to move
about freely, “they may start behaving in general as adult and hence as vocal members of
their community” (1993, p. 177, emphasis in original). Hirschman summed up the history
of the GDR as comprising a variety of exit-voice relationships, with exit undermining the
development of voice according to Hirschman’s original model for the majority of its
four-decade history, and exit and voice reinforcing each other in the last months of the
republic’s existence. A 2003 study by Pfaff and Kim supported both rival and
complementary relationship between exit and voice. The authors performed quantitative
analysis of emigration and protest activities in 214 East German administrative counties
and municipalities and the capital city of East Berlin prior to and during the East German
revolution in September 1989 – March 1990. They found that the incidence of protest
activities was the highest in municipalities with a moderate degree of emigration and
lower in the municipalities where emigration was rare and also in municipalities where
massive emigration occurred.
Hence, in addition to the rival relationship between exit and voice, we can expect
to find, on occasion, a complementary relationship between exit and voice. Indeed, a
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complementary relationship between Serbian exit and Serbian voice in Kosovo appears to
have existed in the mid- to late 1980s. The outmigration of Serbs from Kosovo was one
of the principal concerns of Kosovo Serbs who organized and participated in the popular
Serb grass roots movement in the mid-1980s. In a way, Serbian exit gave rise to and
reinforced Serbian voice. Notably, in addition to petitions, demonstrations, public
meetings, and delegations, the Serb grass roots movement relied on threats and attempts
of exit as some of its main forms of voice. Conversely, in the period after the NATO war,
characterized by retaliatory violence by Kosovo Albanians against Serbs and other ethnic
minorities, exit appeared to be the predominant response by Serbs to the state of extreme
insecurity that they were experiencing in Kosovo. Even as the Serb movement was
experiencing a short-lived resurgence, the pressure of Serb discontent appeared to be
escaping mostly through exit, leaving less pressure for generating voice. The relationship
between exit and voice seemed to work in the similar hydraulic-model fashion following
the 2004 anti-Serb pogroms in Kosovo – many Serbs left Kosovo fearing for the lives of
their families and nearly all of the remaining Serbs chose the psychological exit from
Kosovo’s institutions and political processes. Then, in the post-independence period,
Serbs in Kosovo were observed to engage in exit and although not yet political, but
pragmatic voice. As some Serbs were leaving Kosovo, others turned to Kosovo
institutions and began to engage with the new state.
It appears that in the recent history of Serbs in Kosovo, both rival and
complementary relationship between exit and voice can be found. I proposed above that
the level of human security has an impact on the nature of the relationship between exit
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and voice. Specifically, I proposed that at the low level of human security, exit and voice
operate as alternatives with exit undermining voice, but at the greater level of human
security, exit and voice work in tandem. The recent history of Serbs in Kosovo does
indeed seem to agree with the proposition advanced in the present study: after the war in
1999 and the pogroms in 2004, the level of human security for Serbs in Kosovo was very
low and the greater potential to exit was associated with a reduced likelihood of voice.
On the other hand, in the mid- to late 1980s and in 2009, the level of human security for
Serbs in Kosovo was not at a critically low level and the greater potential to exit was
associated with an increased likelihood of voice.

Human Security
Human security is a conception of security that is centered on individual
wellbeing and safety (Muggah & Krause, 2006). In the early 1990s, following the end of
the Cold War, the focus of security discourse began to shift from the state to the
individual, and in 1994, the Human Development Report produced by the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) termed the new paradigm “human security.” The
paradigm holds that sustainable peace can be achieved only through individual freedom
from fear and freedom from want and thus focuses on fulfillment of basic human needs
and protection of human dignity. Human security refers to a comprehensive security of an
individual from “fear, conflict, ignorance, poverty, social and cultural deprivation, and
hunger, resting upon positive and negative freedoms” (Van Ginkel & Newman, 2000, p.
79).
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Billed as a controversial concept, human security was nevertheless welcomed into
the lexicon of peace, security, development, and democracy. International organizations
and think tanks around the world embraced the concept: the Commission on Human
Security produced the Human Security Now report in 2003, the Human Security Report
Project (HSRP) began publishing yearly Human Security Report in 2005, the
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance produced Democracy,
Conflict, and Human Security: Pursuing Peace in the 21st Century in 2006, and the
World Bank committed to publishing Atlas of Human Security in 2007. By 2008, the
United States Institute of Peace and the International Peace Research Institute have come
to rely on the concept of human security as an integral part of research on peace and
peace building. Today, national governments, civil society organizations, and
international agencies commonly refer to human security in the literature they produce.
Two approaches to human security have been developed: the “narrow approach,”
embraced by the HSRP, that focuses on violent threats to individuals and the “broad”
approach, embraced by the UNDP, that expands the threat agenda to include various
forms of socio-economic and political inequity. Specifically, the UNDP defines human
security as “a concern with human life and dignity” (UNDP, 1994, p. 22). “Human
security…is concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they
exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social
opportunities – and whether they live in conflict or in peace” (UNDP, 1994, p. 23). The
definition advanced by the UNDP includes seven domains of human security: economic,
food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security. Economic
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security involves ability to work, produce income, and obtain goods and services; food
security involves physical and economic access to basic food; health security involves
access to health care facilities and ability to obtain service; environmental security
assumes healthy physical environment; personal security assumes freedom from
harassment and crime against persons and property; community security involves access
to information in the mother tongue and ability to engage in cultural and religious
practices; and political security assumes governmental and institutional honor of basic
human rights.
The domains of human security are non-hierarchical and feature interdependence,
disparities in one domain entail consequences for other aspects of human security (UNDP
1994, p. 35). Threats within each domain of human security can lead to insecurity,
generalized poverty, and threats to personal integrity. Since its inception, the work of the
United Nations has reconfirmed the “universalism of life claims” that assumes equality of
opportunity for all people to expand their capabilities (UNDP, 1994, pp. 13-14). In
response to the continuing trend of violent inter-ethnic conflict, the UNDP Human
Development Report 1994 recommended that countries “take decisive measures to
promote more equal opportunities for all” to achieve peaceful resolutions of conflicts
between ethnic groups (p. 21). The Report recommended that measures to promote equal
opportunities take place across the domains of human security and specifically include
community, economic, and political security, in addition to equality before the law and
access to basic educational opportunities for all.
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The human security framework is not free from institutional and conceptual
differences and measurement challenges, but freedom from fear (personal safety) and
freedom from want (economic security) are regarded as the framework’s central
referents. At the time when data were collected for the present study, a general
assessment of the human security situation for Serbs in Kosovo would yield a low rating
for both their personal safety and economic security. Ethnically motivated crime against
persons and property persisted, Kosovo’s justice system was unresponsive, and freedom
of movement was limited for Serbs outside of the enclaves. A great many Kosovo Serbs
were unemployed and relied on subsistence farming and low pensions from Serbia to
sustain their livelihoods. And yet some Serbs maintained what could be considered
gainful employment in Kosovo – teachers, doctors, and other public sector employees of
parallel institutions that were financially and administratively supported by Serbia’s
government collected higher salaries than their counterparts in Serbia.17 In 2009, a
noticeable number of Kosovo Serbs were turning to previously boycotted Kosovo
institutions for income. Hence, a close examination of the economic security situation for
Serbs in Kosovo would reveal the presence of both lower and higher levels of economic
security. Similarly, a scrutiny of the perceptions of personal safety would reveal both
lower and higher levels of personal safety among Kosovo Serbs. With the KFOR
protection, the practical territorial separation of the Serbian enclaves from their Albanian
neighbors, and location-dependent histories of inter-ethnic violence, some Serbs regarded

17

Personal communication with the staff of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia,

Belgrade, October 2009.
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their personal safety as adequate both inside and outside of their enclave. Therefore, we
can speak of both the low level of human security and the greater level of human security
for Serbs in Kosovo.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHOD

This chapter lays out the method employed in the present study. It states the
hypotheses, describes participants and their recruitment, details the variables employed in
the study, and outlines the strategy for statistical hypothesis testing.

Hypotheses
The goal of the present study is to investigate a possible relationship between
Serb emigration from Kosovo and Serb political action in Kosovo as responses to the
objectionable state of affairs they have experienced in Kosovo. The work by Albert O.
Hirschman (1970) on exit and voice provided the theoretical basis for speculating that
there exists a rival relationship between Serb emigration from Kosovo and Serb political
action in Kosovo. The literature on the fall of the German Democratic Republic,
including Hirschman’s (1993) own examination of the historical events preceding the
GDR’s collapse, added a possibility of a complementary relationship between Serb
emigration and political action. My own interpretation of the importance of
understanding individual conditions in which the choice between exit and voice arises led
to a consideration of the level of human security as having an impact on the nature of the
relationship between Serb emigration and political action. The research question for the
present study became, “What is the relationship between emigration and political action
of Serbs in Kosovo at different levels of human security?” I proposed that at the low level
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of human security, exit and voice have a rival relationship and Serbs with a greater
potential to emigrate would be less likely to engage in political action in Kosovo.
However, at the greater level of human security, exit and voice work in tandem and Serbs
with a greater potential to emigrate would be more likely to engage in political action in
Kosovo.
In developing his arguments about exit and voice, Hirschman conceived of an
essentially rational individual decision-making process whereby persons weigh possible
payoffs against likely costs before choosing to proceed with a particular course of action.
Considerations of the perceived effectiveness or benefits of a certain course of action and
the respective costs associated with exercising that course of action form the basis of the
exit-voice calculus. In addition, loyalty affects the individual calculus between exit and
voice by making exit more costly and voice more probable than they would have been
otherwise. In the present study, I examine costs and benefits associated with Serb
emigration from Kosovo and Serb political action in Kosovo, as well as Kosovo Serb
loyalties, in an effort to more fully explore the relationship between emigration and
political action.
Hence, in the present study, the primary hypotheses regard the relationship
between emigration and political action of Serbs in Kosovo at different levels of human
security and can be stated as follows,
Hypothesis 1: At the low level of human security, exit and voice have a rival
relationship: persons with the high potential to emigrate are less likely to engage in

52

political action in Kosovo and persons with the low potential to emigrate are more likely
to engage in political action in Kosovo.
Hypothesis 2: At the greater level of human security, exit and voice have a
complementary relationship: persons with the high potential to emigrate are more likely
to engage in political action in Kosovo and persons with the low potential to emigrate are
less likely to engage in political action in Kosovo.
The secondary hypotheses regard the relationships between costs, benefits, and
loyalties related to the exercise of exit and voice options and can be stated as follows,
Hypothesis 3: Greater potential to emigrate is associated with: lower costs of exit,
greater perceived benefits of exit, and lesser loyalty to Kosovo.
Hypothesis 4: Greater likelihood of political action is associated with: lower costs
of voice, greater perceived effectiveness of voice, and greater loyalty to Kosovo.
I used a cross-sectional non-experimental design to perform a comprehensive
analysis of the hypothesized relationships. The quantitative data were collected in five
Serbian enclaves in Kosovo by way of a self-administered paper-and-pencil survey.

Participants and Recruitment
The data collection for the present study took place in Kosovo between 29
October 2009 and 14 November 2009, or during the two-week period immediately
preceding the first mayoral and municipal assembly elections since Kosovo’s declaration
of independence.
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The sampling frame for the present study included adult residents of six Serbian
enclaves, all located in the part of Kosovo to the south of the Ibar River. The territory to
the north of the Ibar River was excluded from the study because of the de facto partition
of Kosovo into the northern and southern parts, with the northern part functioning largely
as a municipality of the Serbian state in all practical matters (see footnote 15). The
eligibility criteria for participation in the study included Serbian ethnicity, residence in
Kosovo to the south of the Ibar River, and age of 18 years or older.
The survey materials were hand-delivered to prospective participants by a local
resident in each enclave. The six survey distributors (one person in each enclave) were
the enclaves’ informal community leaders, who without occupying a formal post or an
elected position were at the core of the local informal social networks. These persons
were identified with the help of the local non-governmental organization (NGO) that
maintained significant field presence in the Serbian enclaves and relied on these informal
community leaders as key informants in its work with the Serbian community in
Kosovo.18 Traveling with the colleagues from the NGO, I met with the informal
18

The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia is a highly-regarded regional NGO that

has earned the reputation of a reliable source of information on Serbian enclaves in Kosovo
among diplomatic missions (including the United States), intergovernmental organizations, and
international NGOs working in the region. The Committee maintains close ties with the Serbian
enclaves in Kosovo, particularly those to the south of the Ibar River. The staff of the Committee’s
office in Pristina make frequent visits to the enclaves and are generally well-appraised of the
enclaves’ everyday reality. The staff commonly rely on local key informants, with whom they
have developed trust relationships over the years of the Committee’s work in the enclaves.
Commonly, these key informants are informal community leaders at the core of the enclaves’
informal social networks, with such networks characterizing the traditional organizational
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community leaders who were recommended as potential survey distributors by the
NGO’s staff and explained to them the purpose of the research I was conducting as well
as its nonpartisan and purely academic nature. I elaborated on the voluntary and
anonymous nature of participant involvement in the study, confidentiality protections,
and contact information for investigators. This information was discussed in order to
make the research endeavor as transparent and non-threatening as possible. The role of a
survey distributor entailed and was limited strictly to delivery of the envelopes with
survey materials to prospective study participants. All of the informal community leaders
with whom I met agreed to take on the role of survey distributors. For delivering the
envelopes, the survey distributors were paid a Euro 120 honorarium, in cash. The survey
distributors made it possible to reach prospective participants in the closed and protected
environment of an enclave that was fraught with weariness and distrust of outsiders.
The survey distributors were instructed to distribute the envelopes with survey
materials at random to their fellow enclave residents. Specifically, they were instructed to
approach only adults, both men and women, of various ages, from different households,
and capable of communicating in the Serbian language. Further, survey distributors were
instructed to give one envelope with survey materials to each person who agreed to take a
look at the survey and accompanying information and instructions. Once they accepted
the envelope with survey materials, they became prospective study participants. Although
in principle every adult resident of an enclave had a fair chance of being approached by
structure of the Serbian society in non-urban areas. For example, in one enclave, this person is a
stay-at-home mother, in another enclave it is a sports coach, in the third enclave it is a teacher,
and in the next enclave it is an owner of an inn.
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that enclave’s survey distributor and thus becoming a prospective study participant, in
practice, the random selection of participants could not be assured. It is conceivable and
likely that the survey distributors gave out the materials in a manner of convenience for
the distributors, or to the individuals in the close proximity to the distributors. Hence, the
resultant sample was a convenience sample.
Each prospective participant received an unmarked white envelope containing the
questionnaire and the informational letter that included the instructions for completing
the questionnaire, explained the purpose of the research, identified investigators and their
contact information, and stressed the voluntary and anonymous nature of participation.
All of the materials were translated into the Serbian language (see Appendices B and C).
Also included was an unmarked pink envelope for the return of the completed survey.
The instructions for completing the survey detailed that completed questionnaires should
be placed into pink envelopes, the envelopes sealed, and left unmarked. The participants
were instructed not to write their name, telephone number, or address on either the
questionnaire or the envelope. Throughout the data collection period, I (as the coinvestigator of the study) could be reached by both the study participants and the survey
distributors via a local telephone number.
A total of 199 envelopes with survey materials were left with distributors and a
total of 191 completed and semi-completed surveys were returned.19 Of these, all of the
19

Four survey distributors received 40 envelopes with survey materials each, the fifth survey

distributor received 20 envelopes, and the sixth survey distributor received 19 envelopes. From
the four enclaves where distributors received 40 envelopes each, 152 completed and semicompleted surveys were returned: 39 from one enclave, 39 from another enclave, 37 from the
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36 surveys from one enclave were excluded because of a suspected interference with the
research process.20 Of the remaining 155 surveys from 5 enclaves, 49 surveys were
excluded for various reasons, namely, 8 – because the survey respondents’ age eligibility
could not be confirmed, 1 – because the survey was signed with its respondent’s name,
and 40 – because the surveys were semi-completed and the number and/or distribution of
missing answers was such that key variables could not be computed. The remaining 106
surveys composed the quantitative data for the present study.
Hence, the sample consisted of 106 Serbian men and women from 5 Serbian
enclaves located in 4 Kosovo municipalities of Vucitrn, Gracanica, Gnjilane, and
third enclave, and 36 from the fourth enclave. From the fifth and sixth enclaves, all of the surveys
were returned, 20 and 19 respectively.
20

Prior to the distribution of the survey materials in this enclave, local authorities expressed an

interest in the present study and specifically in the process of data collection. Having learned that
the study involved a questionnaire that would be filled out by local residents, a representative of
local authorities offered to distribute the questionnaires himself. His offer was politely declined.
The representative continued to offer various kinds of assistance and it appeared that he wanted to
be involved in the data collection process, or at a minimum, to be kept appraised of it. His offers
of help may have been truly sincere, however, it is conceivable that he wanted to make sure that
the completed questionnaires communicated a certain kind of message. Although I made certain
to explain that this study was nonpartisan and purely academic in nature, in a politically charged
environment of Kosovo, this point could have been simply ignored or misunderstood. I have no
evidence that local authorities did interfere with the data collection process in any way. However,
their eagerness to be involved gave me reason to suspect that subsequent to our meeting, they
may have reached out to the survey distributor in this enclave and perhaps suggested certain
modifications to the data collection process. In an effort to preserve the integrity of this study, I
chose to exclude all of the surveys from this enclave from the study.
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Orahovac21 (see map in Appendix A). All of the participants were of 18 years of age or
older and were able to read, understand, and write in the Serbian language. The
participants completed the survey instrument in an anonymous manner, returned the
completed surveys in sealed envelopes, and left both the survey instrument and the
envelope unmarked. No identifying information about the participants was recorded and
the identities of the participants remain unknown.

Measures
The investigation of the relationship between exit and voice at different levels of
human security was approached from the perspective of action potential as opposed to
completed actions. That is, I look at the potential to exit and the likelihood of voice
among Serbs in Kosovo, as opposed to completed acts of emigration and political action
by Serbs in Kosovo.

Exit
Hirschman’s principal thesis is, “The presence of the exit alternative can therefore
tend to atrophy the development of the art of voice” (p. 43, emphasis added). Hence, in
the present study, my interest lies with the ‘potential’ to exit, or emigrate, from Kosovo
among Kosovo Serbs as opposed to the completed acts of exit. Whereas exit from
Kosovo represents a possible action for all Serbs in Kosovo, the persons who have a

21

I do not include the names of the enclaves and instead identify them by their respective

municipalities in order to offer an added measure of confidentiality to the study participants.
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strong desire to leave Kosovo are more likely to do so than the persons who do not want
to leave Kosovo. Similarly, the persons who have a definite place outside of Kosovo to
which they could relocate are more likely to relocate than the persons who have no place
to go. Hence, I define the high potential to emigrate as having either a strong desire to
leave Kosovo or a definite place where to relocate.
To differentiate between respondents with the high potential to emigrate and the
respondents with the low potential to emigrate, 2 questions were used:
1. Do you want to leave Kosovo for good and live somewhere else? and
2. If you decided to leave Kosovo, would you have a place where to relocate?
The respondents answered each question on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from
1 (do not want to leave and have no place to relocate, respectively) to 10 (want to leave
very much and have a definite place to relocate, respectively). Respondents were
assigned an EXIT POTENTIAL score of 1 if they either had a strong desire to leave Kosovo
for good (score of 7 or higher on the first question) or had an actual place for relocation
in mind (score of 7 or higher on the second question). Respondents were assigned an EXIT
POTENTIAL

score of 0 if they had neither a desire to leave Kosovo for good (score of 6 or

lower on the first question) nor a place where to relocate (score of 6 or lower on the
second question). The EXIT POTENTIAL score of 1 represented the high potential to
emigrate from Kosovo and the EXIT POTENTIAL score of 0 represented the low potential to
emigrate from Kosovo.

59

Voice
Hirschman defined voice as “any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape
from, an objectionable state of affairs” (p. 30). If voice is conceptualized as active efforts
to improve adverse conditions, then much of what is commonly referred to as political
participation can be identified as voice (Wille, 2001). Political participation may take on
various forms, including conventional modes of political participation, such as voting,
contacting public officials, and forming politically-minded organizations, and
unconventional modes of participation, such as organizing demonstrations, writing
petitions, carrying out acts of civil disobedience, or starting an uprising.
In the present inquiry into the response of Kosovo Serbs to the adversity they
have experienced in Kosovo’s new political reality, voice is regarded as active and
constructive political participation by Serbs that is performed within the legal boundaries
of the new political setting with the intent of improving the Kosovo Serbs’ condition.
That is, I define voice as non-violent political action and focus specifically on seven
conventional and unconventional modes of political participation that were among those
studied in a seminal study on political action by Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase and
colleagues (1979). Five conventional modes of political participation include acts of
political involvement that are related to the electoral process – discussing politics with
others, voting, contacting officials, joining a political party, and contributing to
community efforts to solve local problems. Two unconventional modes of political
participation include acts of peaceful protest – signing a petition and participating in a
non-violent demonstration.
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In the present study, the interest lies with the ‘likelihood’ of voice, or political
action, among Serbs in Kosovo as opposed to the completed acts of political
participation. Each person may favor and be ready to engage in one or several forms of
political action and not in other forms – for example, be willing to vote and sign a
petition, but not walk in a peaceful demonstration (Marsh & Kaase, 1979). To assess the
likelihood of voice among the study’s participants, the study’s participants were asked
whether they would engage in certain forms of political action in order to improve the
current situation in their community. Specifically, the respondents were asked whether
would do any of the following,
1. Talk to others about politics;
2. Vote in local elections;
3. Contact local politicians or public officials;
4. Walk in a peaceful demonstration;
5. Join a political party;
6. Work with other people on solving local problems; and
7. Sign a petition.
The respondents answered each question on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from
1 (would never do) to 10 (would certainly do). The scores on the seven questions were
summed up to generate a VOICE score, ranging from 7 to 70, for each respondent.
Respondents with the lower VOICE scores were less likely to engage in political action
and respondents with the higher VOICE scores were more likely to engage in political
action.
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Human Security
Human security refers to a comprehensive security of an individual from threats
to personal integrity. A narrow conception of human security, embraced by the Human
Security Report Project focuses on organized violence as the main threat to human
security, while a broader conception of human security, embraced by the United Nations
Development Programme, expands the threat agenda to include various forms of socioeconomic and political inequity. Whereas the human security framework is not free from
institutional and conceptual differences and measurement challenges, freedom from fear
and freedom from want are regarded as the framework’s central referents.
Correspondingly, for the purposes of the present inquiry, human security is
regarded as encompassing two categories: personal safety and economic security.
Personal safety assumes freedom from violence, harassment, intimidation, and crime
against persons and property. Economic security involves ability to work, produce
income, and obtain goods and services for oneself and one’s family.
As discussed above, a close examination of the economic security situation and
the perceptions of personal safety among Serbs in Kosovo would reveal the presence of
both lower and higher levels of economic security and personal safety, respectively.
Therefore, we can speak of both the low level of human security and the greater level of
human security for Serbs in Kosovo.
To differentiate between respondents at the low level of human security and
respondents at the greater level of human security, two questions were used which
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corresponded to two categories of human security, personal safety and economic security.
Each question was followed by a set of descriptive statements that reflected possible
individual situations. Following the work by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (2004) on measuring post-conflict reconstruction, we assessed personal safety
with the following question and four possible responses:
How safe are you to carry out your everyday life in Kosovo?
a. I am not safe in my home
b. I am not safe outside of my immediate community
c. I leave my community, but travel only to places I know intimately
d. I travel outside of my community with relative ease
Economic security was assessed with the following question and four possible responses
that reflected personal economic conditions:
What is your economic situation right now?
a. I have no income
b. I do not have enough money to meet my basic needs
c. I have enough money to meet only my basic needs
d. I earn consistent and sufficient income to take care of my family
If participants chose the first response on the personal safety question (a. I am not
safe in my home) or one of the first two responses on the economic security question (a. I
have no income or b. I do not have enough money to meet my basic needs), they were
assigned a HUMAN SECURITY score of 0. The HUMAN SECURITY score of 0 represented the
low level of human security – these respondents did not feel safe or had inadequate
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economic standing or enjoyed neither personal safety nor economic security.
Respondents were assigned a HUMAN SECURITY score of 1 if they chose one of the
remaining responses on the personal safety question (b, c, or d) and one of the second two
responses (c or d) on the economic security question. The HUMAN SECURITY score of 1
represented the greater level of human security – these respondents felt safer and had a
more favorable economic standing than their fellow Serbs with the HUMAN SECURITY
score of 0.
Whereas I maintain that the levels of human security for Serbs in Kosovo can be
separated into the low level and the greater level, with the greater level representing
conditions more favorable to individual life, health, development, and success than the
low level of human security, I adopt a label ‘high human security’ instead of the greater
for the purposes of hypothesis testing. Hence, I speak of the low human security and high
human security to differentiate between participants who felt insecure and more secure,
respectively.

Possibility of Improvement
The idea of belief in the possibility of improvement in adverse conditions is
essential to Hirschman’s theory. When engaging in individual exit–voice calculus,
persons affected by decline in firms, organizations, and states believe that their situation
can be improved by either leaving for a more favorable place or staying and using their
voice to improve their current conditions. In the context of the present inquiry, if Kosovo
Serbs perceive their destination to have very similar conditions to what they are presently
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experiencing and thus not produce an improvement in their life, health, development, or
success, they may not emigrate from Kosovo. Similarly, if Kosovo Serbs believe that
their acts of political participation in Kosovo are not going to be effective and
instrumentally linked to the goal of improving the objectionable conditions locally, they
may not exercise the option of voice (Ennis & Schreuer, 1987). Conversely, a belief that
a certain course of action would be effective in reducing adversity and bringing about an
improvement in current conditions may propel individuals to embark on that course of
action and either pursue exit or exercise voice.

Benefits of exit. Persons who believe that their situation elsewhere would be less
adverse, hard, or dissatisfying than their present situation would be more likely to choose
exit than persons who believe that the move would not bring about improvement. Kosovo
Serbs who see themselves as being happier if they leave Kosovo as opposed to if they
stay in Kosovo and also those who believe that attempts at improving things locally are
futile would be more likely to consider emigration from Kosovo as a beneficial course of
action.
The participants’ perceptions regarding benefits of exit were assessed with two
sets of questions. The first set included the following two questions,
1. Imagine yourself 5 years from now, after having left Kosovo. Compared to
your present situation, do you see yourself as more or less happy?
2. Imagine yourself 5 years from now, after having stayed in Kosovo. Compared
to your present situation, do you see yourself as more or less happy?
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The respondents answered each question on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from
1 (less happy) to 10 (much happier), with the middle of the scale being designated as
“about the same as now.”
In the second set of questions, the respondents were asked to rank their agreement
with the following two statements,
1. I will stay in Kosovo and keep waiting until thins get better; and
2. Trying to improve things around here is a waste of time.
The respondents ranked their agreement with each statement on a 10-point Likert
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree).
Question No. 2 from the first set and question No. 1 from the second set were
reverse scored. The scores on all four questions were summed up to generate an EXIT
BENEFIT

score, ranging from 4 to 40, for each respondent. Respondents with the lower

EXIT BENEFIT

scores attributed lower benefits to exit and respondents with the greater

EXIT BENEFIT

scores attributed greater benefits to exit.

Benefits of voice. People who are willing to participate in constructive political
action probably believe that such action matters in making a difference in their state of
affairs. Conversely, if people believe that political participation is inconsequential and
leads to little improvement, they may be unlikely to engage in political action. They may
also form different beliefs about different modes of political action and consider voting
pointless, for example, but participating in a demonstration effective. In addition, people
may regard their particular socio-political environment as being responsive or
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unresponsive to political action and form opinions on effectiveness or ineffectiveness of
voice in their particular setting.
These considerations of effectiveness of voice in general, specific forms of voice,
and voice in their particular setting reflect on the individuals’ perceptions of political
action as a means toward actual positive change. In the present study, I am interested in
whether members of the Serbian community in Kosovo believe that active and
constructive political participation as exercised by Kosovo Serbs can facilitate
improvement in their current situation. To assess the study participants’ perceptions of
the benefits of voice as a change agent, the participants were asked whether they regarded
different modes of political participation as effective means toward achieving actual
positive change in their community. As in the assessment of the likelihood of voice
among the study’s participants, the same seven modes of political participation from the
study by Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase and colleagues (1979) were used here,
namely,
1. Talking to others about politics;
2. Voting in local elections;
3. Contacting local politicians or public officials;
4. Walking in a peaceful demonstration;
5. Joining a political party;
6. Working with other people on solving local problems; and
7. Signing a petition.
The study participants were asked to think of improving the current situation in
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their community through these different actions and then rate each one on a scale from 1
to 10, with “1” being the kind of action that is pointless and incapable of bringing
improvement and “10” being the kind of action that is very effective and capable of
change. The scores on the seven questions were summed up to generate a VOICE BENEFIT
score, ranging from 7 to 70, for each respondent. Respondents with the lower VOICE
BENEFIT

scores regarded political action as ineffective in bringing about improvement and

hence attributed lower benefits to voice. Respondents with the greater VOICE BENEFIT
scores regarded political action as effective in bringing about improvement and hence
attributed greater benefits to voice.

Costs
As part of individual exit-voice deliberations, perceptions regarding potential
benefits of exit and effectiveness of voice get weighted against potential costs associated
with exercising exit and voice options. Costs come in a variety of forms of both economic
and psychological nature and can be readily apparent and easy to assess, as in moving
expenses, or less clear and difficult to measure, as in loss of reputation. In the present
study, the interest lies not with an objective assessment of costs associated with
emigration from Kosovo and political participation in Kosovo, but rather with Kosovo
Serbs’ subjective perceptions of costs as obstacles to exit and voice.

Cost of exit. Leaving one’s place of residence is expensive in both direct and
indirect costs. The direct costs involve actual expenditures that enable relocation, such as
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transportation expenses and start-up expenses at the new place of residence. The indirect
costs involve psychological tolls associated with abandoning one’s home, livelihood, and
social ties in favor of an uncertain future elsewhere (Davenport, Moore, & Poe, 2003). If
persons lack resources to cover the direct costs of exit or perceive the psychological tolls
as unacceptable or regard both direct and indirect costs as insurmountable, they may
reject exit as a possible course of action.
In the present study, costs of exit were regarded as obstacles to emigration from
Kosovo. A decision to leave one’s place of residence and relocate elsewhere is commonly
associated with several considerations that may present themselves as obstacles to
leaving. The study participants were asked to indicate whether these considerations
would hinder their exit from Kosovo if they chose to emigrate. Specifically, the
considerations included five obstacles, namely,
1. Not enough money to relocate;
2. Painful to separate from friends and neighbors in Kosovo;
3. Difficult to leave home and land in Kosovo;
4. Hard to start a new life somewhere else; and
5. Lack of job skills to gain employment elsewhere .
The study participants were asked whether these items would be big problems for
them if they wished to leave Kosovo for good. The respondents rated each item on a 10point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not a problem) to 10 (insurmountable problem). The
scores on the five questions were summed up to generate an EXIT COST score, ranging
from 5 to 50, for each respondent. Respondents with the lower EXIT COST scores
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attributed lower costs to emigration from Kosovo and respondents with the higher EXIT
COST

scores attributed higher costs to emigration from Kosovo.

Cost of voice. The cost of voice involves the likelihood of negative consequences
associated with political participation. If individuals fear that it is unsafe for them to
participate in political action, then the cost of voice may be so high as to exclude political
participation from the possible courses of action.
In the present study, I investigate exit and voice from the perspective of action
potential as opposed to completed actions and specifically look at the ‘likelihood’ of
voice, or political action of Serbs in Kosovo. People are more likely to engage in political
action in the atmosphere of “psychological safety” in one’s community of reference
(Edmondson, 1999, pp. 354-355). Adapted from Edmondson’s (1999) concept of team
psychological safety, community psychological safety is understood as persons’ belief
that their community is safe for interpersonal risk taking. If persons believe that in their
community political action may be met with loss of reputation, rejection from neighbors,
ostracism, or retaliation, they may find the cost of voice to be too high to warrant
involvement in political action. On the other hand, if persons feel safe to participate in
political action and feel that their participation would be met with approval in their
community, they may attribute negligible cost to voice and more readily engage in
political action.
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The study participants’ perceptions regarding the cost of voice were assessed with
two sets of questions. The first set addressed the concern for individual safety associated
with political participation and included the following three questions,
1. If you wished to express your views publicly, how comfortable would you feel
about doing so?
2. If you wanted to join a political party of your own choosing, how comfortable
would you feel about doing so?
3. If you wanted to walk in a demonstration or participate in a rally of your own
choosing, how comfortable would you feel about doing so?
The respondents answered each question on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from
1 (very uncomfortable) to 10 (very comfortable).
The second set of questions addressed the concern for community approval, or
lack thereof, in response to community members’ political participation and included the
following three questions,
1. If someone in your community voted in local elections, how do you think your
community would respond?
2. If someone in your community started working with the local Albanians on
local issues, how do you think your community would respond?
3. If someone in your community started working with local politicians and
public officials, how do you think your community would respond?
The respondents answered each question on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from
1 (condemn) to 10 (approve), with the middle of the scale being designated as “stay
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neutral.” All six questions were reverse scored and the scores were summed up to
generate a VOICE COST score, ranging from 6 to 60, for each respondent. Respondents
with the lower VOICE COST scores attributed lower costs to voice and respondents with the
higher VOICE COST scores attributed higher costs to voice.

Loyalty
Hirschman defined loyalty as “that special attachment to an organization” (p. 77)
and proposed that loyalty makes exit less likely and voice more probable than they would
have been otherwise. In the context under investigation, loyalty can be conceptualized as
affective attachment that people develop to their place of residence, as well as the bonds
of belonging there (Hoffmann, 2008). Pizzorno (1986) interpreted Hirschman’s loyalty
“as a degree of identification” that contributed to the concept of self (in Weber, 2009, p.
5).
The study participants’ loyalty to Kosovo was assesses with questions about their
feelings of affective attachment to Kosovo, a sense of identification with Kosovo, and a
sense of belonging in Kosovo. Specifically, the respondents were asked to rank their
agreement with the following three statements,
1. I would be happy to spend the rest of my life in Kosovo;
2. I feel that Kosovo’s problems are mine too; and
3. I belong in Kosovo.
The respondents ranked their agreement with each statement on a 10-point Likert
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree). The scores on the three
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questions were summed up to generate a LOYALTY score, ranging from 3 to 30, for each
respondent. Respondents with the lower LOYALTY scores had lesser loyalty to Kosovo
and respondents with the higher LOYALTY scores had greater loyalty to Kosovo.

Statistical Analysis Strategy
This section outlines the approach to statistical hypothesis testing. The Statistical
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software was used for all data analyses.

Hypotheses 1 and 2
The analyses of variance (ANOVAs) will be performed to assess if there were
differences in VOICE by EXIT POTENTIAL for low human security and high human security
participants separately. The ANOVA is the appropriate statistical analysis to use because
it examines differences in a single dependent variable by a categorical independent
variable with two or more levels. VOICE is the continuous dependent variable for the
ANOVA. EXIT POTENTIAL is the categorical independent variable with two discreet
levels: low potential and high potential. Null hypothesis will be rejected if the obtained F
value (the ratio of two independent variance estimates of the same population variance) is
larger than the critical F value (Pagano, 2010).
The assumptions for normality and homogeneity of variance will be assessed
prior to conducting the ANOVAs. The assumption for normality holds that the
distribution of scores is normal, or bell-shaped, and it will be assessed with the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The assumption for homogeneity of variance holds that both

73

groups have equal error variances and it will be assessed with the Levene’s test.
Commonly, the ANOVA is regarded as a robust statistic with relatively minor effects of
assumptions violations (Howell, 2010).

Hypothesis 3
Two multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) will be conducted to assess
if there were differences in EXIT COST, EXIT BENEFIT, and LOYALTY by EXIT POTENTIAL for
low human security and high human security participants separately. The MANOVA is
the appropriate statistical analysis to use because it examines group differences on a set
of dependent variables by a categorical independent variable with two or more levels and
it is a robust statistic with respect to Type 1 error (Stevens, 2002). EXIT COST, EXIT
BENEFIT, and LOYALTY form

the set of the continuous dependent variables for the

MANOVA. EXIT POTENTIAL is the categorical independent variable with two discreet
levels: low potential and high potential. If the MANOVA results are statistically
significant, individual analyses of variance (ANOVAs) will be performed for each of the
dependent variables to assess where the mean differences between groups lie
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006).
The assumptions for normality and homogeneity of variance/covariance matrices
will be assessed prior to conducting the MANOVAs. The assumption for normality holds
that the distribution of scores is normal, or bell-shaped, and it will be assessed with the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Homogeneity of covariance matrices is the multivariate
equivalent to homogeneity of variance (assumption that both groups have equal error
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variances) and it will be assessed with the Box’s M test (Leech, Barrett, & Morgan,
2008).

Hypothesis 4
Six Pearson product-moment correlations will be conducted to assess if there was
a relationship between VOICE and each of the following variables, VOICE COST, VOICE
BENEFIT, and LOYALTY.

Three Pearson correlations will be conducted once for low human

security participants and again for high human security participants. The Pearson
product-moment correlation is the appropriate statistical analysis to use because all
variables are continuous and the hypothesis seeks to assess the relationship between two
variables. Pearson product-moment correlation is indeed a bivariate measure of
relationship strength between two variables (Pagano, 2010).
The obtained correlation coefficient (r) can vary from -1, indicating a perfect
negative linear relationship, to +1, indicating a perfect positive linear relationship, with
the value of 0 indicating no relationship between variables. A positive significant Pearson
correlation suggests that as one variable increased, the other variable also tended to
increase. A negative significant Pearson correlation suggests that as one variable
increased, the other variable tended to decrease. Correlations above ±.10 are considered
to have a weak relationship, above ±.30 are considered to have a moderate relationship,
and above ±.50 are considered to have a strong relationship (Cohen, 1988).
The assumption for normality (bell-shaped distribution of scores) will be assessed
with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test prior to analysis.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

This chapter provides the description of the sample used in the study and presents
the results of the data analysis proposed in the previous chapter.

Sample Descriptives
One hundred and six participants took part in the study. Slightly more than half of
the participants were male (55%; n=57). The age of the participants varied, with nearly
half of the sample being between the ages of 18 and 33 (47%; n=50). The majority of the
participants regarded themselves as simply ‘Serb’ (60%; n=62) and almost a third of the
sample regarded themselves as ‘Kosovo Serb’ (31%; n=32). Approximately half of the
participants had children younger than 16 living with them in Kosovo (51%; n=49). The
majority of the participants felt that the opportunities for their children were better in
Serbia than in Kosovo (51%; n=31) and 33% (n=20) felt that the opportunities for their
children in Kosovo were about the same as in Serbia. Frequencies and percentages for
sample descriptives are presented in Table 1.
Participants also answered an open question of how long they had lived in
Kosovo. One participant answered 300 years, and the response was removed for being an
outlier. Once removed, time in Kosovo ranged from 6 to 64 years. The average time in
Kosovo was 36.06 years (SD = 13.25).
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Table 1
Frequencies and Percentages for Sample Descriptives
Demographic

n

%

Female

46

44.7

Male

57

55.3

18-25

22

20.8

26-33

28

26.4

34-41

13

12.3

42-49

17

16.0

50-57

16

15.1

58-65

9

8.5

66 or older

1

0.9

Kosovo Serb

32

30.8

Serb

62

59.6

Kosovar

1

1.0

European

6

5.8

Yugoslav

3

2.9

Yes

49

51.0

No

47

49.0

Much better in Kosovo

6

9.8

Somewhat better in Kosovo

4

6.6

About the same

20

32.8

Somewhat better in Serbia

15

24.6

Much better in Serbia

16

26.2

Gender

Age

Nationality (How do you regard yourself?)

Children younger than 16

Opportunities for children
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Variables
Categorical Variables
Participants were classified into two categories of human security, low and high,
and into two categories of exit potential, low and high. The majority of participants were
in the low human security category (59%; n=62). More of the participants were also in
the low exit potential category (59%; n=62). Frequencies and percentages for participant
categories are presented in Table 2.

Table 2
Frequencies and Percentages for Human Security and Exit Potential Categories
Category

n

%

Low security

62

58.5

High security

44

41.5

Low potential

62

58.5

High potential

44

41.5

Human security

Exit

Continuous Variables
Six composite scores were created for continuous variables: voice, exit benefit,
voice benefit, exit cost, voice cost, and loyalty. Cronbach’s alpha tests of reliability and
internal consistency were conducted on each of the composite scores. Reliabilities ranged
from .55 (exit benefit) to .82 (voice and voice benefit). Based on the guidelines for
evaluation of reliability coefficients by George and Mallery (2003), reliability ranged
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from poor to good.22 The lower reliability composite scores were examined to assess if
removing an item made a significant change in reliability. No significant changes were
possible and the composite scores remained. Table 3 presents Cronbach’s alphas as well
as means and standard deviations for the composite scores.
An expectation-maximization (EM) procedure available in the SPSS software was
utilized to impute missing values for the composite scores. This procedure has been
shown to yield more accurate parameter estimates and standard errors than more
traditional methods of handling missing data (e.g., listwise or pairwise deletion; Schafer,
1997). Using the EM procedure, 1.9% of the voice scores, 5.7% of the exit benefit scores,
1.9% of the exit cost scores, and 2.8% of the loyalty scores were imputed.

Table 3
Cronbach’s Alpha, Mean, and Standard Deviation for Composite Scores
Composite

Cronbach’s

Number of

M

SD

score

alpha

items

Voice

.82

7

34.87

15.81

Exit benefit

.55

4

19.10

7.52

Voice benefit

.82

7

30.82

14.92

Exit cost

.66

5

33.36

10.57

Voice cost

.63

6

36.50

9.84

Loyalty

.72

3

23.41

6.98

22

The guidelines for evaluation of Cronbach’s alpha are as follows, > .9 Excellent, > .8 Good, >

.7 Acceptable, > .6 Questionable, > .5 Poor, < .5 Unacceptable (George and Mallery, 2003).

79

Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1
H10: At the low level of human security, there is no relationship between exit and
voice.
H1a: At the low level of human security, exit and voice have a rival relationship:
persons with the high potential to emigrate are less likely to engage in political action in
Kosovo and persons with the low potential to emigrate are more likely to engage in
political action in Kosovo.
To examine hypothesis 1, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to
assess if voice was different by exit potential for the low human security participants
only. The assumption for normality was assessed with a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The
results of the test were not significant, meeting the assumption. The assumption for
homogeneity of variance was assessed with a Levene’s test. The results of the test were
not significant, meeting the assumption.
The results of the ANOVA were not significant, F (1, 60) = 0.26, p = .609,
suggesting that there was no difference in voice by exit potential for low human security
participants. As such, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The data do not support the
alternative hypothesis that there exists a rival relationship between exit and voice at the
low level of human security. Results for the ANOVA are presented in Table 4.
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Table 4
ANOVA for Voice by Exit Potential for Low Human Security Participants

Source

Exit

Low potential

High potential

F (1, 60)

p

M

SD

M

SD

0.26

.609

34.77

16.36

32.65

14.40

Hypothesis 2
H20: At the greater level of human security, there is no relationship between exit
and voice.
H2a: At the greater level of human security, exit and voice have a complementary
relationship: persons with the high potential to emigrate are more likely to engage in
political action in Kosovo and persons with the low potential to emigrate are less likely to
engage in political action in Kosovo.
To examine hypothesis 2, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to
assess if voice was different by exit potential for the high human security participants
only. The assumption for normality was assessed with a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The
results of the test were not significant, meeting the assumption. The assumption for
homogeneity of variance was assessed with a Levene’s test. The results of the test were
not significant, meeting the assumption.
The results of the ANOVA were not significant, F (1, 42) = 2.88, p = .097,
suggesting there was no difference in voice by exit potential for high human security
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participants. As such, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The data do not support the
alternative hypothesis that there exists a complementary relationship between exit and
voice at the greater level of human security. Results for the ANOVA are presented in
Table 5.

Table 5
ANOVA for Voice by Exit Potential for High Human Security Participants

Source

Exit

Low potential

High potential

F (1, 40)

p

M

SD

M

SD

2.88

.097

40.00

16.83

31.86

14.81

Ancillary Hypothesis
Once the results of statistical analyses failed to support hypotheses on the
relationship between exit and voice at different levels of human security, I attempted to
see if there were a relationship between exit and voice for the whole sample of
participants without regard for the level of human security.
H(ANC)0: There is no relationship between exit and voice.
H(ANC)a: There is a relationship between exit and voice such that the likelihood of
political action is different (higher or lower) for persons with the high potential to
emigrate than for persons with the low potential to emigrate.
An ANOVA was conducted to test the ancillary hypothesis and assess if there was
a difference in voice by exit potential for the whole sample of participants. The
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assumption for normality was assessed with a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the
assumption for homogeneity of variance was assessed with a Levene’s test. The results of
both tests were not significant, meeting the assumptions.
The results of the ANOVA were not significant, F (1, 104) = 2.05, p = .156,
suggesting that there was no difference in voice by exit potential. Again, the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis. The data do not
support the hypothesis that there is a relationship between exit and voice at any level of
human security. Results for the ANOVA are presented in Table 6.

Table 6
ANOVA for Voice by Exit Potential

Source

Exit

Low potential

High potential

F (1, 104)

p

M

SD

M

SD

2.05

.156

36.71

16.59

32.27

14.43

Hypothesis 3
H30: Greater potential to emigrate is not associated with: (3A) costs of exit, (3B)
perceived benefits of exit, and (3C) loyalty to Kosovo.
H3a: Greater potential to emigrate is associated with: (3A) lower costs of exit,
(3B) greater perceived benefits of exit, and (3C) lesser loyalty to Kosovo.
To examine hypothesis 3, two multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs)
were conducted to assess if there were differences in exit cost, exit benefit, and loyalty by
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exit potential for low human security and high human security participants. One
MANOVA was conducted for each security level. The assumption for normality was
assessed with two Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. The results of the tests were not
significant, meeting the assumption. The assumption for equality of covariance was
assessed with two Box’s M tests. The results of the tests were only significant for the
high human security participants and thus the Wilks’ Lambda correction was used to
interpret the MANOVA.

Low level of human security. The results of the MANOVA were significant for
low human security participants, F (3, 58) = 3.79, p = .015, suggesting there were
differences in exit cost, exit benefit, and loyalty by exit potential. Individual ANOVAs
were conducted to assess where the differences lie. The ANOVA for exit cost was
significant, F (1, 60) = 6.36, p = .014, partial η2 = .10, suggesting that among the low
human security participants, those with low potential to exit have higher exit costs than
those with high potential to exit. The ANOVA for exit benefit was also significant, F (1,
60) = 7.38, p = .009, partial η2 = .11, suggesting that among the low human security
participants, those with low potential to exit have lower exit benefits than those with high
potential to exit. Lastly, the ANOVA for loyalty was not significant, F (1, 60) = 3.33, p =
.073, partial η2 = .05, suggesting that there was no difference in loyalty by exit potential
for low human security participants. Both significant ANOVAs had an effect size that
showed a moderate difference between exit potentials (Cohen, 1988). Results for the

84

MANOVA are presented in Table 7. Means and standard deviations are presented in
Table 8.

Table 7
MANOVA for Exit Cost, Exit Benefit, and Loyalty by Exit Potential for Low Human
Security Participants
MANOVA

Exit potential

ANOVA F (1, 60)

F (3, 58)

Exit cost

Exit benefit

Loyalty

3.79*

6.36*

7.38*

3.33

Note. * p < .05.

Table 8
Means and Standard Deviations for Exit Cost, Exit Benefit, and Loyalty by Exit Potential
for Low Human Security Participants
Low Potential

High Potential

M

SD

M

SD

Exit cost

36.90

9.44

30.39

10.41

Exit benefit

17.79

6.41

22.62

6.98

Loyalty

24.15

5.43

20.70

9.52

Greater level of human security. The results of the MANOVA were significant
for high human security participants, F (3, 40) = 5.03, p = .005, suggesting that there
were differences in exit cost, exit benefit, and loyalty by exit potential. Individual
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ANOVAs were conducted to assess where the differences lie. The ANOVA for exit cost
was significant, F (1, 42) = 7.84, p = .008, partial η2 = .16, suggesting that among the
high human security participants, those with low exit potential have higher exit costs than
those with high potential to exit. The ANOVA for exit benefit was also significant, F (1,
42) = 4.86, p = .033, partial η2 = .10, suggesting that among the high human security
participants, those with low exit potential have lower exit benefits than those with high
exit potential. Lastly, the ANOVA for loyalty was significant, F (1, 42) = 8.15, p = .007,
partial η2 = .16, suggesting that among the high human security participants, those with
low exit potential had higher loyalty than those with a high exit potential. All three
significant ANOVAs had an effect size that showed a moderate difference between exit
potentials (Cohen, 1988). Results of the MANOVA are presented in Table 9. Means and
standard deviations are presented in Table 10.

Table 9
MANOVA for Exit Cost, Exit Benefit, and Loyalty by Exit Potential for High Human
Security Participants
MANOVA

Exit potential

ANOVA F (1, 60)

F (3, 58)

Exit cost

Exit benefit

Loyalty

5.03*

7.84*

4.86*

8.15*

Note. * p < .05.
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Table 10
Means and Standard Deviations for Exit Cost, Exit Benefit, and Loyalty by Exit Potential
for High Human Security Participants
Low Potential

High Potential

M

SD

M

SD

Exit cost

35.87

9.39

27.29

10.94

Exit benefit

15.83

5.19

21.09

10.10

Loyalty

26.61

4.76

21.48

7.05

The null hypotheses 3A and 3B can be rejected in favor of the alternative
hypotheses; higher potential to exit was related to lower costs of exit and higher benefits
of exit. However, the null hypothesis 3C can be only partially rejected: higher potential to
exit was related to lower loyalty for high human security participants only.

Hypothesis 4
H40: Likelihood of political action is not associated with: (4A) costs of voice,
(4B) perceived effectiveness of voice, and (4C) loyalty to Kosovo.
H4a: Greater likelihood of political action is associated with: (4A) lower costs of
voice, (4B) greater perceived effectiveness of voice, and (4C) greater loyalty to Kosovo.
To examine hypothesis 4, six Pearson product-moment correlations were
conducted to assess if there was a relationship between voice and each of the following
variables, voice cost, voice benefit, and loyalty. Three Pearson correlations were
conducted once for low human security participants and again for high human security
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participants. The assumption for normality was assessed with six Kolmogorov-Smirnov
tests. All six tests were not significant, meeting the assumption.
The results for the Pearson correlations showed that for low human security
participants, voice was positively strongly related to voice benefit, r = .67, p < .001 and
negatively moderately related to voice cost, r = -.33, p = .009, suggesting that when voice
increased, voice benefit also tended to increase and voice cost tended to decrease for low
human security participants. The results for the Pearson correlations also showed that for
high human security participants, voice was positively strongly related to voice benefit, r
= .82, p < .001, negatively strongly related to voice cost, r = -.55, p < .001, and positively
moderately related to loyalty, r = .30, p = .045. This suggests that when voice increased,
voice benefit and loyalty also tended to increase and voice cost tended to decrease for
high human security participants. Results for the Pearson correlations are presented in
Table 11.

Table 11
Pearson Correlations for Voice with Voice Cost, Voice Benefit, and Loyalty
Voice, low human security

Voice, high human security

Voice cost

-.33**

-.55**

Voice benefit

.67**

.82**

.02

.30*

Loyalty
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
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The null hypotheses 4A and 4B can be rejected in favor of the alternative
hypothesis; participants with higher voice tended to have lower costs of voice and higher
benefits of voice. However, the null hypothesis 4C can be only partially rejected:
participants with higher voice tended to have higher loyalty for high human security
participants only.

Correlation Matrix
In an effort to gain further insight into the relationships between exit and voice,
their respective costs and benefits, and loyalty, a Pearson product-moment (and pointbiserial) correlation matrix was constructed for the whole sample of participants without
regard for the level of human security. All of the correlations involving the exit potential
variable were point-biserial instead of Pearson product-moment due to exit potential
being a dichotomous variable. The results of the matrix showed that exit potential was
negatively moderately correlated with exit cost, rpb = -.36, p < .001, positively
moderately correlated with exit benefit, rpb = .31, p = .001, and negatively weakly
correlated with loyalty, rpb = -.28, p = .003. This suggests that participants with low exit
potential had higher exit costs, lower exit benefits, and greater loyalty and participants
with high exit potential had lower exit costs, higher exit benefits, and lesser loyalty.
Voice was negatively moderately correlated with voice cost, r = -.42, p < .001, and
positively strongly correlated with voice benefit, r = .74, p < .001. This suggests that
participants with greater likelihood of voice had lower voice costs and higher voice
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benefits and participants with lesser likelihood of voice had higher voice costs and lower
voice benefits. Results of the correlation matrix are presented in Table 11.

Table 11
Correlation Matrix between Exit, Exit Cost, Exit Benefit, Voice, Voice Cost, Voice
Benefit, and Loyalty
Exit

Benefits of

Voice

Benefits of

cost

exit

cost

voice

Exit benefits

-.17

-

Voice cost

-.22*

.13

-

Voice benefit

.20*

-.19

-.28**

-

Loyalty

.31**

-.43**

-.13

.10

-

.19

-.15

-.42**

.74**

.13

-

-.36**

.31**

.05

-.18

-.28**

-.14

Voice
Exit

Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
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Loyalty Voice

CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION

This chapter briefly summarizes the preceding chapters, offers explanations for
the results of data analysis, answers the main question of the study, and concludes this
work with a discussion of findings and their implications.

In February 2008, Kosovo Albanian parliament declared independence from
Serbia and announced Kosovo as the new and youngest European country. This final act
of severance of Kosovo from Serbia after years of United Nations administration marked
another point of deterioration for the ethnic Serbian community in Kosovo. Although no
immediate worsening of the Kosovo Serbs’ human security situation was observed, many
Serbs perceived the declaration of independence as a new threat to their wellbeing.
Voluble international support for Kosovo independence translated into significantly
reduced international community and protective forces presence on the ground, which
was met by Serbs with elevation of fear for their safety in the independent predominantly
ethnic Albanian Kosovo. The question of what to do, to leave Kosovo or to stay, became
ever more imminent for Kosovo Serbs. Over the next year and a half, Serbs continued
leaving Kosovo, where economic opportunities and prospects for advancement were few
and personal safety still in doubt. At the same time, notable numbers of Kosovo Serbs
expressed willingness to engage with new Kosovo institutions: they sought out jobs,
applied for Kosovo identity cards and vehicle registration plates, and expressed interest in
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learning the Albanian language – actions that communicated willingness to bridge the
parallel world of Serbian enclaves with the Kosovo mainstream.
The direction of the Kosovo Serbs’ response to the new political reality in Kosovo
carries significant socio-political, economic, and security implications for the Balkan
region and Europe as a whole. Serb emigration from Kosovo, most inevitably to Serbia,
would engender new grievances, further strain already traumatized communities, likely
intensify ethnic tensions, and possibly lead to new violence in the region that is
desperately struggling to close the dark chapter of the Yugoslav wars and embrace peace,
democracy, and ethnic pluralism. On the other hand, Serb engagement with Kosovo
institutions within the framework of the new state, pursuit of the full realization of their
rights through constructive political action, and participation in decentralized political
processes would likely improve the human security situation for Serbs in Kosovo and
possibly advance ethnic relations in the region to a new workable balance.
Although Serb emigration from Kosovo and Serb political action in Kosovo may
appear as disparate courses of action, the seminal work by Albert O. Hirschman (1970)
on individual responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states provides theoretical
basis for tying them together. Hirschman proposed that individuals affected by the
decline primarily resort to either of the two courses of action, exit and voice, and further
that exit and voice have a rival relationship: as potential for exit decreases, likelihood of
voice increases. Inspired by Hirschman’s simple framework, the goal of the present study
was to investigate a possible relationship between Serb emigration from Kosovo, the
most basic form of exit, and Serb political action in Kosovo, the fundamental form of
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voice. The literature on the fall of the German Democratic Republic, including
Hirschman’s (1993) own elaboration on the exit-voice dynamic, expanded the inquiry to
allow for both rival, as Hirschman (1970) originally proposed, and complementary, as
Hirschman (1993) later conceded, relationship between exit and voice. Recognition of the
importance of the human security situation amidst which the individual choice between
exit and voice arises informed the formulation of the research question for the study,
What is the relationship between emigration and political action of Serbs in Kosovo at
different levels of human security? Accordingly, the study’s main hypotheses regarded
the relationship between emigration and political action of Serbs in Kosovo at two levels
of human security. Hypothesis 1 stated that at the low level of human security, when
people feel unsafe and cannot take care of their basic needs, exit and voice operate as
alternatives, such that persons with the high potential to emigrate are less likely to engage
in political action in Kosovo and persons with the low potential to emigrate are more
likely to engage in political action in Kosovo. Conversely, hypothesis 2 stated that at the
greater level of human security, when individual safety and economic security are not
critically low, exit and voice work in tandem, such that persons with the high potential to
emigrate are more likely to engage in political action in Kosovo and persons with the low
potential to emigrate are less likely to engage in political action in Kosovo.
Two additional hypotheses regarded associations between exit and voice and their
respective rational-choice determinants, costs and benefits, as well as loyalty to Kosovo
that Hirschman posited as instrumental in skewing the rational exit-voice calculus by
making exit more costly and voice more probable than they would have been otherwise.
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Hypothesis 3 stated that greater potential to emigrate is associated with lower costs of
exit, greater perceived benefits of exit, and lesser loyalty to Kosovo. Hypothesis 4 stated
that greater likelihood of political action is associated with lower costs of voice, greater
perceived effectiveness of voice, and greater loyalty to Kosovo.
The study was carried out on a sample of 106 Serbian men and women who were
living in five Serbian enclaves in Kosovo in the fall of 2009. These adults completed a
self-administered paper-and-pencil survey designed specifically for the present study, and
thus allowed for original quantitative data to be generated for the purposes of hypotheses
testing. An essential element of the data, and a considerable strength of the study, was the
timing of data collection, which took place on the ground in the Serbian enclaves in
Kosovo during the two-week period immediately preceding independent Kosovo’s first
mayoral and municipal assembly elections held on 15 November 2009.
The elections gave Kosovo Serbs an exceptional opportunity to claim ownership
of protections and privileges that came with decentralized governance recommended for
Kosovo by UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. Known as the Ahtisaari plan, the
Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement (2007) provided for extensive
protections of the rights and interests of the Kosovo Serb community in the independent
Kosovo. Through decentralization at the local level, Kosovo Serbs would retain extensive
control over local affairs in Serb majority municipalities, including in the areas of
education, healthcare, cultural affairs, and security, and would have the right to cooperate
directly and independently with Serbia. By participating in the November 15th elections,
Kosovo Serbs would not only exercise their voice through voting, but would also
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communicate their willingness to proceed with decentralization and hence further seek
full realization of their political, social, and cultural rights as a historic nationality in
Kosovo. As the survey questions dealt directly with the participants’ considerations of
leaving Kosovo and their willingness to engage in political action in Kosovo, the
responses may have reflected the participants’ real, as opposed to hypothetical, intentions
to engage in exit-voice behaviors. As such, the timing of the data collection may have
awarded an improved validity of data.
The analysis of data revealed several important anticipated and unanticipated
findings. As expected, the majority of the study participants were experiencing
significant hardship – they did not feel safe or were very poor or enjoyed neither personal
safety nor economic security. However, not everyone felt insecure and indeed both the
low level and the greater level of human security were endorsed by the study participants.
Emigration from Kosovo continued to be on people’s minds. Roughly forty percent of
study participants had either a strong desire to leave Kosovo for good or had an actual
place for relocation in mind. On the whole, participants expressed lower than average
willingness to engage in political action in order to improve the current situation in their
community.
The directions of associations between emigration and political action and their
respective costs and benefits were consistent with the rational decision-making process
that Hirschman regarded as laying at the basis of the exit-voice calculus. Greater potential
to emigrate among the study participants was indeed associated with lower costs and
greater benefits of exit. Similarly, greater likelihood of political action was associated
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with lower costs and greater benefits of voice. The direction of association between
emigration and loyalty, as well as between political action and loyalty, was partially
consistent with Hirschman’s prediction. Exit was indeed associated with lesser loyalty
and voice was associated with greater loyalty, however in both cases the relationship was
significant only for participants at the greater level of human security. For participants at
the low level of human security, no significant relationship between loyalty and either
exit or voice was found.
The results of data analysis did not support either a rival or a complementary
relationship between exit and voice at different levels of human security. Moreover,
omitting human security from the analysis did not produce a finding of a relationship
between exit and voice. It appeared that there was no relationship between emigration
and political action in the sample of Kosovo Serbs who participated in the study and
emigration and political action were indeed disparate courses of action. The reason why
the results did not support the study’s main hypotheses may lie in the incongruence
between the study’s population and the assumptions about the population of actors facing
deteriorating conditions that Hirschman envisioned for his model.
Hirschman conceived of exit and voice as two primary ways in which individuals
respond to decline or deterioration in the state of affairs of a firm, organization, or state to
which they belong. When confronted with a deterioration of organizational conditions,
individuals either exit for better conditions elsewhere or exercise voice to bring about
improvement locally. Exit and voice are usefully thought of as alternative solutions to a
predicament, and naturally are expected to have a relationship: as potential for adopting
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one solution increases, likelihood of adopting another solution decreases. Hirschman
conceived of the choice between exit and voice as being made according to the rational
decision-making process that involves weighing costs and benefits associated with each
action and choosing the more favorable cost-benefit ratio. Hence, it is helpful to think of
two assumptions that precede the formulation of Hirschman’s principal thesis on the rival
relationship between exit and voice. These assumptions are,
1. Actors regard exit and voice as solutions to their predicament; and
2. Actors engage in the rational decision-making process when thinking about
exit and voice.
Conceivably, these assumptions have to be satisfied in the context where
empirical support for Hirschman’s model is sought out. Plausibly, the failure to find
empirical support for the model may be attributed to the studied population being notably
different from what Hirschman originally envisioned with respect to these assumptions.
Indeed, the finding of no relationship between exit and voice in the context of the small
remaining Serbian community in Kosovo may be ascribed to the study’s population not
perceiving exit as a solution to their predicament and thus not meeting the model’s first
assumption. The second assumption may be considered as satisfied, however. The results
of the data analysis revealed that exit and voice were indeed associated with their
respective rational-choice determinants, costs and benefits, in the predicted direction:
greater exit was associated with lower costs of exit and greater benefits of exit and
greater voice was associated with lower costs of voice and greater benefits of voice.
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The reason why no relationship between exit and voice was found in this study’s
sample of Kosovo Serbs could be this community’s perception of exit not as a solution to
declining conditions, but as a further loss. It is possible that the Serbs who remained in
Kosovo in the fall of 2009 were different from the Serbs who had left Kosovo in the
previous years with respect to how they viewed emigration from Kosovo. As discussed in
Chapter 2, the waves of Serb emigration from Kosovo came in response to historically
documented situations of decline in safety and security for the Serbian community in
Kosovo: during the period of post-Tito instability in the mid-1980s, in the midst of
retaliatory violence against Serbs following the NATO war of 1999, and subsequent to
the anti-Serb pogroms in 2004. The Serbs who had exited Kosovo during those periods
may have indeed regarded exit as a solution to their predicament, a response to
deterioration in the state of affairs of the territorial ethnic group to which they belonged.
When choosing exit, they believed that by leaving Kosovo they would improve their lot
and that things would be better for them elsewhere. In a sample drawn from that
population, support for a relationship between exit and voice may have indeed been
found.
Contrastingly, the Serbs who remained in Kosovo in the fall of 2009 may not
have perceived exit as a form of relief. In her ethnographic study of shrimp fishers in
Louisiana, Jill A. Harrison (2009) discusses how former shrimpers who left shrimping in
the face of occupational decline experienced exit from their trade as a “personal tragedy”
and a “real loss” (p. 44). Although the situation of Kosovo Serbs is considerably different
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from that of Louisiana shrimpers, the concept of exit as a personal loss may be equally
applicable.
In the wake of the March 2004 pogroms, nearly all of the last urban Serbs in the
cities of Pristina and Prizren left Kosovo. The majority of remaining Serbs were rural
subsistence farmers who maintained traditional ways of life in their communities –
worked the land that had been in their families for generations, attended services at
Serbian Orthodox churches, and tended the graves of their ancestors at the cemeteries
adjacent to their villages. For them, Kosovo was not a place where lucrative employment
opportunities were available for Serbs during the Milosevic’ reign (see footnote 10). For
them, Kosovo was motherland. These Serbs did not leave Kosovo when things got tough,
possibly because they had nowhere to go, because the cost of leaving was too high,
because things really were not that bad, but also possibly because they thought of leaving
their motherland as a profound loss. Despite feeling unsafe or having little money to take
care of their needs, the prospect of abandoning their homes, leaving behind possessions,
and severing ties with their motherland was not a choice, as Hirschman envisioned exit to
be, it was a tragedy.
The majority of Kosovo Serbs who participated in the present study were born
and spent their whole lives in Kosovo.23 If they were indeed among those who regarded
exit from Kosovo as a further loss, as opposed to a solution to deteriorating conditions,
then a relationship between exit and voice would be hard to find. The phrasing of the
23

A comparison of participant responses to the question about their age category and the open

question of how long they had lived in Kosovo yields a reasonably certain finding that the
majority of Kosovo Serbs in this study were born and spent their whole lives in Kosovo.
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survey questions regarding voice allows for a reasonably certain assertion that voice was
presented to the participants as an improvement-oriented choice. Specifically, the
instructions preceding the questions that assessed the likelihood of voice and the
questions that assessed the benefits of voice began with, “Think of improving the current
situation in your community through different actions.” However, the survey neither
presented exit as an improvement-oriented choice nor included questions that would
allow for a determination of whether participants regarded exit as an improvementoriented choice. None of the utilized measures of exit potential, exit benefits, and exit
costs assessed the participants’ perceptions of exit from Kosovo as a valid choice for
themselves. A measure of Kosovo Serbs attitudes toward emigration from Kosovo would
make a valuable addition to future research.
There exists a possibility that the lack of identifiable relationship between exit and
voice in this study comes not from the participants’ perception of exit as a loss instead of
a solution to declining conditions, but from my operationalization of the exit and voice
variables. Hirschman (1970) formulated his “central point” and the principal thesis of his
work as follows, “The presence of the exit alternative can therefore tend to atrophy the
development of the art of voice” (p. 43, emphasis omitted). For Hirschman, exit is a
straightforward dichotomy – “one either exits or one does not” (p. 15). Voice, on the
other hand, is “far more ‘messy’ concept because it can be graduated, all the way from
faint grumbling to violent protest” (p. 16). Dowding et al. (2000) agreed that,
“operationally, exit is a dichotomous, voice a continuous variable” (p. 471). I stayed true
to Hirschman’s thesis and the author’s conception of exit and voice categories. In this

100

study, exit was regarded as the presence of potential to exit, or emigrate from Kosovo,
and was represented by a dichotomous variable. Voice was regarded as the degree of
likelihood of engaging in various forms of political action and was represented by a
continuous variable. Hence, the possibility that these variables were operationalized
incorrectly is rather small.
The second unanticipated, but interesting finding in this study’s sample of Kosovo
Serbs was on the relationship between loyalty and exit, as well as loyalty and voice, at
different levels of human security. The results of the data analysis revealed that loyalty
was associated with exit and voice in the direction consistent with Hirschman’s model,
but only for participants at the greater level of human security. For participants at the low
level of human security, loyalty had no significant relationship with either exit or voice.
A likely explanation for this finding may lie in Abraham H. Maslow’s (1943)
theory on hierarchy of human needs. Maslow posited that the most basic of human needs,
such as those for food, shelter, safety, and security must be satisfied before individuals
can focus their motivations on higher level needs, such as those for belonging and
acceptance, achievement and respect, and finally, self-expression and realization of one’s
full potential. In the present study, the low level of human security was defined as
conditions of substantial hardship amidst which people feel unsafe and have difficulty
meeting their basic needs. The greater level of human security was defined as more
favorable conditions of reduced hardship amidst which people feel safer and have greater
resources to provide for their needs. Hence, unlike persons at the low level of human
security, persons at the greater level of human security had their basic physiological and
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safety needs satisfied and, consistent with Maslow’s theory, could focus their motivations
on higher level needs for belonging and attachment, often expressed as loyalty.
Although small, this finding adds merit to my proposal that the conditions in
which people make decisions about exit and voice matter. At different levels of human
security, the determinants of the decisions about exit and voice may vary – people may
monitor different kinds of information and focus their motivations on different needs.
Future studies should expand investigation of human security in the context of the exitvoice framework and specifically attempt to identify a possible human security threshold,
below and above which the exit-voice dynamics may be quite different.
I must acknowledge the limitations of the study related to the size and selection of
the sample, which may not be representative of the population of Serbs living in Kosovo
to the south of the Ibar River. Although the informal community leaders acting as survey
distributors made it possible to reach prospective participants in the closed and protected
environment of a Serbian enclave, and hence allowed for the research endeavor to take
place, their involvement produced the sample of convenience. In addition, survey
distributors may have introduced a bias into the selection of the sample. Such bias may
favor the persons who are more ‘traditionally Serbian’ in their attitudes – opposed to
Kosovo’s independence, supportive of Serbia’s vow to never recognize Kosovo as an
independent country, reluctant to engage with new Kosovo institutions, and suspicious of
decentralization, which they associate with the Ahtisaari plan and hence with
endorsement of Kosovo’s independence. The bias may exclude the Serbs who are more
‘reformist’ in their attitudes – neutral in regards to Kosovo’s independence or supportive
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of it, critical of Serbia’s policies toward Kosovo, pragmatic about engaging with new
Kosovo institutions, and appreciative of protections and privileges that come with
decentralized governance.
Nevertheless, sample characteristics point to the de facto level of
representativeness of this sample. Namely, the sample included comparable numbers of
women and men, young adults and more mature individuals, persons with and without
young children, those who believed that opportunities for their children were better in
Serbia than in Kosovo and those who did not think so. The participants endorsed both
levels of human security, and although more persons fell into the low human security
category, for many participants security was not at a critically low level. The majority of
participants had low potential to emigrate from Kosovo, but for many emigration was not
entirely out of the question. On the whole, participants expressed lower than average
willingness to engage in political action, but the sample featured considerable variability
in relation to voice.
Another limitation of the study involves possible inadequacies of translation.
There is a small chance that although several native speakers independently revised the
original translation of the questionnaire into the Serbian language, the final version of the
questionnaire still contained translation mistakes.
Despite these limitations and considering that very few empirical studies
investigate emigration and political action as related phenomena in the context of a
territorial ethnic minority group, the research presented here makes an important
contribution to the literature. Looking at the Kosovo Serb community’s experience with
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adversity, the study offers an insight into mechanisms that underlie the decision by
members of a minority group, disadvantaged by changes in the political context, to
remove themselves from the adverse setting or to remain in the setting and attempt to
improve their conditions. Whereas socio-economic and political conditions give rise to
emigration and political action, on the micro-level, each individual responds to a unique
set of circumstances when choosing to emigrate and engage in political action. This study
made the first known attempt to integrate the individual context, assessed through the
lens of human security, into the exit-voice framework and found small, but important
support for considering individual states of human security.
This research looked at beliefs, attitudes, constraints, considerations, and other
individual-level factors conceptually related to the exercise of exit and voice options by
members of a minority community in a post-war, ethnically divided, newly independent
polity. As such, this research contributes to the literature on minority participation,
minority emigration, political stabilization in ethnically divided states, and the diversified
body of literature on ethnic relations in the Balkans. In particular, this research adds to
the newly forming multidisciplinary literature on microdynamics of civil conflict.
The research program on microdynamics of civil conflict emerged during the first
decade of the 21st century in an effort to advance knowledge of the processes, content,
and effects of civil wars. Earlier cross-national, large-N econometric and comparative
studies produced significant findings regarding civil conflict and its consequences on the
macro level, but left the micro level largely unexplored (Kalyvas, 2008). To fill the gap in
the literature, the research program on microdynamics of civil conflict embraced the
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subnational level of inquiry, with units of analysis such as events, organizations, and
individuals. The program is hosted by several influential research institutions, including
Yale University and the Peace Research Institute Oslo, has international organizations on
board, including the World Bank and the European Commission, involves prolific
research networks, such as the Households in Conflict Network, and accounts for a
growing body of original works, including doctoral dissertations (e.g., Kocher, 2004;
Trejo Osorio, 2004), working papers (e.g., Bruck, Justino, Verwimp, & Avdeenko, 2010;
Justino, 2008; Kondylis, 2008), journal articles (e.g., Engel & Ibanez, 2007; Restrepo,
Spagat, & Vargas, 2004; Verwimp, 2005), and books (e.g., Kalyvas, 2006; Straus, 2006;
Weinstein, 2007). The common goal that unites these studies is increasing knowledge
about civil conflict in order to cope effectively with its consequences, prevent its
recurrence, and advance peace, economic development, human rights, rule of law, and
political stability in post-conflict societies.
Some argue that a multi-ethnic Kosovo is “an unrealistic dream” (Simonsen,
2004, p. 295) and that a combination of exclusion and self-exclusion will continue to
keep the ever-diminishing number of minorities from engaging with the new Kosovo
institutions. This study found that considerations of emigration from Kosovo and political
action in Kosovo by members of the Serbian community were in line with the rational
decision-making process. This finding implies that Kosovo Serbs do not simply follow
the directives by Serbia’s government on whether to leave Kosovo or to stay, to vote in
the local elections or to boycott them. Instead, they weigh costs and benefits associated
with each action and decide accordingly. Hence, if the goal of the new Kosovo
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government and the international actors that supervise Kosovo’s independence is to
increase Kosovo Serbs’ engagement with the new state, they need to change Kosovo
Serbs’ perceptions of the benefits of such engagement. For example, if the name of
Ahtisaari, which is perceived as being equivalent with independence, was divorced from
the idea of decentralized Kosovo, the benefits of participating in decentralized political
processes for Kosovo Serbs could go up. If a letter from a small group of Kosovo Serbs
to public officials was taken seriously and produced results, then the benefits of using
voice for other Kosovo Serbs would go up. With a more favorable perception of the
power of voice to affect change and bring about improvement, the likelihood of political
action among Serbs in Kosovo would be greater. With increased participation and
meaningful engagement of Serbs with all aspects of governance in Kosovo, true
multiethnic democracy is more likely to be achieved and political foundation to stabilize
in this new and youngest European country.
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Appendix A
Municipal Map of Kosovo*

Source: UNICEF Innovations Lab, 2011.

* Where two names are listed for a municipality, the first name is Albanian name for the
municipality and the second name is Serbian.
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Appendix B
Informational Letter
Информације о истраживачкој студији
Универзитета Клемсон

Драги господине или госпођо,
Позвани сте да учествујете у истраживачкој студији Излаз и глас током
транзиције, коју спроводи професор Универзитета Клемсон Гари Mелтон и
докторски кандидат Екатерина Jазикова. Сврха ове студије је чисто академска и неполитичка. Информације добијене у процесу ове студије истраживачи неће
користити ни у чију политичку корист, нити за одбрану нечијих политичких
интереса. Искључиви циљ студије је да се упозна са погледима српског народа у
погледу њиховог живота на Косову.
Ваше учешће подразумева пружање одговора на 80-так питања везаних за Ваша
лична искуства и ставове. Потребно време за Ваше учешће износи око 25 минута.
Молимо Вас немојте да уписујете своје име, адресу или телефонски број на
упитнику. Готово сва питања у упитнику имају понуђени одговор. Молимо Вас да
одаберете и означите онај који најбоље описује Вашу ситуацију. Када попуните
читав упитник, ставите га у коверту коју ћете добити и залепите је. Молимо Вас
немојте да уписујете своје име, адресу или телефонски број на коверту.

Могуће користи
Ово истраживање ће проширити постојећа сазнања о садашњим искуствима
српског народа на Косову. Као такво, ово истраживање може помоћи онима који
доносе одлуке на нивоу заједнице, на националном и на међународном нивоу да
планирају мере које за циљ имају повећану безбедност људи, као и развој и мир у
региону.

Заштита поверљивости података
Од Вас нећемо тражити да нам пружите никакве информације којима ћете се
идентификовати, нити ћемо регистровати било коју информацију која Вас може
потенцијално повезати са учешћем у овом истраживању. Од Вас нећемо тражити
Ваше име, ни адресу становања, Ваша приватност је потпуно заштићена. Уколико
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дође до било какве публикације која је последица ове истраживачке студије, у њој
ће бити објављени само општи подаци добиjени истраживањем.

Добровољно учешће
Ваше учешће у овој истраживачкој студији је добровољно. Можете да одлучите да
не желите да учествујете и прекинете истраживање у било које време. Можете
почети да одговарате на питања и да схватите да не желите да наставите. По
сопственом избору можете да престанете у сваком тренутку. Ипак, охрабрујемо
Вас да попуните читав упитник. Ваше учешће представља значајан допринос
истраживању, чиjи jе циљ повећање шанси за стварање стабилног мира и развој
Вашег региона.

Ризици и непријатности
Ризик повезан са учешћем у овом истраживању је минималан и не прелази Ваша
свакодневна искуства. Нека питања могу имати лични значај за Вас и можда Вам
због њих буде непријатно. Ако се то догоди, не морате да одговорите на та питања.
Ипак, нама би много значило ако бисте могли да попуните читав упитник.

Контакт за информације
Уколико имате било каква питања или недоумице о овој студији или се појави било
какав проблем, молимо Вас да контактирате Екатерину Jазикову тел.
+381.63.186.4162. Ако имате било каква питања или недоумице око Ваших права
као учесника овог истраживања, молимо Вас да контактирате Канцеларију за
Научна Истраживањa Универзитета Клемсон тел. +1.864.656.6460.
Изузетно смо Вам захвални на Вашем времену и труду. Ако желите да прочитате
наш извештај по завршетку студије, молимо Вас да контактирате Екатерину
Jазикову yazykov@aol.com или +1.347.720.5183. Биће нам задовољство да наше
налазе поделимо са Вама.
Хвала Вам за Ваше време и труд.
Срдачно,
Екатерина Jазикова

120

Informational Letter (English translation)

Information Concerning Participation in a Research Study
Clemson University

Dear Sir or Madam,
You are invited to participate in the research study Exit and Voice during Transition,
conducted by Professor Gary Melton and doctoral candidate Ekaterina Yazykova of
Clemson University. The purpose of this study is purely academic and non-political. The
researchers will not use any information gained in the process of this study to either
advance anyone’s political cause or defend anyone’s political interests. The goal of this
study is to learn about perceptions of the Serbian people regarding their life in Kosovo.
Your participation will involve answering about 80 questions related to your personal
experiences and thoughts. The amount of time required for your participation will be
approximately 25 minutes. Please do not write your name, telephone number, or address
on the survey. Nearly all of the questions in the survey have response choices attached to
them. Please choose the response that best describes your situation. Once you complete
the entire survey, please put it in the pink envelope provided here and seal it. Please do
not write your name, telephone number, or address on the envelope.

Potential benefits
This research will expand the existing knowledge about the present-day experiences of
the Serbian people in Kosovo. As such, this research may help decision makers on
community, national, and international levels in planning appropriate measures toward
greater human security, development, and peace in the region.

Protection of confidentiality
We will neither ask you to provide any identifying information nor record any identifying
information that could potentially link you as a participant to the responses you provided.
We will not ask you for your name or address. Your privacy is protected. In any
publication that might result from this study, only general characteristics of this
community will be revealed.

Voluntary participation
Your participation in this research study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate
and discard this survey at any time. You may start answering questions and realize that
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you do not want to continue. It is your choice to stop at any point. However, we do
encourage you to complete the entire survey. Your participation is a valuable contribution
to research, which is focused on improving the chances for sustainable peace and
development in your region.

Risks and discomforts
The risks associated with this research are minimal and do not exceed those experienced
in the course of every-day life. Some questions may have personal significance for you
and may then cause certain discomforts. If so, feel free not to respond to those questions.
It would be of great help to us, however, if you completed the entire survey.
Contact information
If you have any questions or concerns related to this survey or if any problems arise,
please contact Ekaterina Yazykova at the telephone number +381.63.186.4162. If you
have any questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please contact
the Office of Research Compliance at Clemson University at the telephone number
+1.864.656.6460.
We greatly appreciate your time and effort. If you wish to read our final report once the
study is completed, please contact Ekaterina Yazykova at the e-mail address:
yazykov@aol.com or the telephone number: +1.347.720.5183. We will be happy to share
our findings with you.
Thank you for your time and effort.
Sincerely,
Ekaterina Yazykova
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Appendix C
Questionnaire

(Only the questions that were used in the present study appear below. The actual
questionnaire that was distributed to the prospective participants included additional
measures.)

УПИТНИК

Драги господине или госпођо,
Искрено Вам захваљујемо што сте показали добру вољу да попуните овај упитник.
Упитник могу да попуне само особе старије од 18 година.
Да ли имате 18 година или више? (заокружите)

ДА

НЕ

Ако је Ваш одговор НЕ, молимо Вас да упитник дате старијој особи у Вашем домаћинству
да попуни упитник. Ако је Ваш одговор ДА, молимо Вас да наставите са попуњавањем
упитника. Хвала.

За питања од 1 до 3, одаберите број који показује колико се слажете са том изјавом

1) Био бих задовољан / Била бих задовољна да проведем остатак живота на Косову
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
уопште се
потпуно се
не слажем
слажем

2) Мислим да су проблеми Косова и моји проблеми
1
2
3
4
5
6
уопште се
не слажем

3) Мени је место на Косову
1
2
3
уопште се
не слажем

4

5

6
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7

8

9

10
потпуно се
слажем

7

8

9

10
потпуно се
слажем

За питања од 4 до 7 размислите о напуштању Косова заувек и одаберите број који
најбоље исказује шта осећате

4) Да ли планирате да напустите Косово заувек и живите негде другде?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
не желим
веома много
да одем
желим да одем

5) Замислте се кроз 5 година од сада, након напуштања Косова. Када то упоредите са
садашњом ситуацијом, да ћете бити више или мање срећни?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
мање срећан/
отприлике исто
много срећнији/
срећна
као и сада
срећнија

6) Замислите се кроз 5 година од сада, пошто сте остали на Косову. Када то упоредите са
садашњом ситуацијом, да ћете бити више или мање срећни?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
мање срећан/
отприлике исто
много срећнији/
срећна
као и сада
срећнија

7) Ако би одлучили да напустите Косово, имате ли место где би се преселили?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
немам место где бих
имам место где бих
се преселио / преселила
се преселио / преселила

Ако желите да заувек напустите Косово, да ли би Вам доле наведени разлози (од 8 до
12) представљали велики проблем („1“ означава да то уопште није проблем, а „10“
означава толико велики проблем да одлазак чини немогућим)

8) Нема довољно новца за селидбу
1
2
3
4
то није
проблем

5

6

7

8

9

10
непремостив
проблем

9) Одлазак са Косова представљао би превише болан растанак од пријатеља и комшија на
Косову
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
то није
непремостив
проблем
проблем
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10) Тешко је напустити дом и земљу на Косову
1
2
3
4
5
6
то није
проблем

11) Тешко је почети живот негде другде
1
2
3
4
5
то није
проблем

6

7

8

9

10
непремостив
проблем

7

8

9

10
непремостив
проблем

12) Недостатак пословних знања да се добије запослење на другом месту
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
то није
непремостив
проблем
проблем

Размислите о могућности побољшања Ваше тренутне ситуације у заједници кроз
учешће у различитим активностима. Коjа од доле наведених активности (13-19)
представља Вас („1“ представља особу која се никада не би укључила ни у jедну
активност, а „10“ представља особу која се радо укључује у активност)?

13) Разговор са другима о политици
1
2
3
4
никад то не бих
радио / радила

14) Гласање за локалне органе власти
1
2
3
4
никад то не бих
радио / радила

5

6

7

8

9

10
сигурно бих то
радио / радила

5

6

7

8

9

10
сигурно бих то
радио / радила

8

9

10
сигурно бих то
радио / радила

8

9

10
сигурно бих то
радио / радила

15) Контактирање локалних политичара или званичника
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
никад то не бих
радио / радила

16) Учествовање у мирним демонстрацијама
1
2
3
4
5
никад то не бих
радио / радила
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6

7

17) Чланство у политичкој партији
1
2
3
4
никад то не бих
радио / радила

5

6

7

18) Рад са другим људима на решавању локалних проблема
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
никад то не бих
радио / радила

19) Потписивање петиције
1
2
3
никад то не бих
радио / радила

4

5

6

7

8

9

10
сигурно бих то
радио / радила

8

9

10
сигурно бих то
радио / радила

8

9

10
сигурно бих то
радио / радила

За питања од 20 до 22 која су доле наведена, шта мислите како бисте Ви реаговали
приликом учешћа у одређеноj активности („1“ представља особу којој би било веома
непријатно да учествује у активност, а „10“ представља особу којој би било веома
пријатно да учествује у активност)

20) Ако бисте желели да јавно изнесете своје ставове, како бисте се осећали поводом тога?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
веома непријатно
веома пријатно

21) Ако би пожелели да се учланите у политичку партију по свом избору, колико би Вам
било пријатно да то урадите?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
веома непријатно
веома пријатно

22) Ако би пожелели да учествујете у демонстрацијама по свом избору, колико би Вам
било пријатно да то урадите?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
веома непријатно
веома пријатно

За питања од 23 до 25 која су доле наведена, шта мислите како би реаговала Ваша
заједница на поједина понашања њених припадника („1” – заједница би то потпуно
осудила, a „10” – заједница би то потпуно подржала)
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23) Ако би неко у Вашој заједници гласао на локалним изборима, како би, по Вашем
мишљењу, реаговала Ваша заједница?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
осудила
била би неутрална
одобрила

24) Ако би неко из Ваше заједнице почео да ради са локалним Албанцима на локалним
питањима, како би, по Вашем мишљењу, реаговала Ваша заједница?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
осудила
била би неутрална
одобрила

25) Ако би неко из Ваше заједнице почео да ради са локалним политичарима и
званичницима, како би, по Вашем мишљењу, реаговала Ваша заједница?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
осудила
била би неутрална
одобрила

Изаберите броj коjи одребуjе вредност наведене активности (питања од 26 до 32) - „1“
указује да је активност бесмислена и нема могућности да донесе побољшање, а „10“
указује да је активност врло ефикасна и може да донесе побољшање.

26) Разговор са другима о политици
1
2
3
4
бесмислено

5

6

7

8

9

10
врло ефикасно

27) Гласање на локалним изборима
1
2
3
4
бесмислено

5

6

7

8

9

10
врло ефикасно

28) Контактирање локалних политичара или званичника
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
бесмислено

8

9

10
врло ефикасно

29) Учествовање у мирољубвим демонстрацијама
1
2
3
4
5
6
бесмислено

7

8

9

10
врло ефикасно

30) Учлањивање у политичку партију
1
2
3
4
бесмислено

7

8

9

10
врло ефикасно

5

6
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31) Рад са другим људима на решавању локалних проблема
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
бесмислено

8

9

10
врло ефикасно

32) Потписивање петиције
1
2
3
бесмислено

8

9

10
врло ефикасно

4

5

6

7

За питања 33 и 34 заокружите слово испред одговора који најбоље описује Вашу
ситуацију

33) Колико сте безбедни у Вашем свакодневном животу на Косову?
а.
б.
ц.
д.

Нисам безбедан / безбедна код куће
Нисам безбедан / безбедна изван моје најближе заједнице
Одлазим из заједнице, али само до места које добро познајем
Путујем ван моје заједнице без проблема и страха

34) Каква је Ваша тренутна економска ситуација?
а.
б.
ц.
д.

Немам никакве приходе
Немам довољно новца да задовољим основне потребе
Имам довољно новца да задовољим основне потребе
Зарађујем довољно и редовно да издржавам своју породицу

Колико се слажете са доле наведеним изјавама 35 и 36? (заокружите један број)

35) Остаћу на Косову и наставићу да чекам болје услове
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
уопште се
не слажем

36) Покушај да овде нешто уредим је чист губитак времена
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
уопште се
не слажем
----
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8

9

10
потпуно се
слажем

8

9

10
потпуно се
слажем

37) Имате ли деце испод 16 година која живе са Вама на Косову?

ДА

НЕ

Ако немате деце млађе од 16 година која живе са Вама на Kосову, прескочите питање
38. У супротном, одговорите.

38) Да ли Вам се будућност Ваше деце чини бољом на Косову или у Србији? (одаберите
одговор који најпрецизније исказује Ваше мишљење)
а. Много боље на Косову
б. Нешто боље на Косову
ц. Отприлике исто
д. Нешто боље у Србији
е. Много боље у Србији

39) Како себе дефинишете? (заокружите један одговор)
Косовски Србин

Србин

Косовар

Европљанин

Југословен

40) Заокружите Вашу старосну доб:
18-25

26-33

41) Који је Ваш пол?

34-41

42-49

50-57

58-65

Женски

42) Колико дуго живите на Косову?

Мушки

___________ година
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66 и старији

